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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three empirical essays that share the theme of
education policy evaluation.
Chapter 1 looks at cognitive spillovers between siblings who live in the same
household. The research question asked is whether such spillovers exist, and
what their magnitude may be. Using longitudinal data on children aged 5 to
14 and living in the United States, I identify positive, significant and sizable
cognitive spillovers between siblings. In the light of these findings, education
policies that increase the cognitive achievement of any target population of
children may also indirectly benefit their cohabiting siblings.
Chapter 2 evaluates the outcome of a decentralization reform that has af-
fected public education in Colombia. Municipalities with more than 100 thou-
sand inhabitants were made autonomous in the management of public education
on their territories, while cities below that threshold were not given autonomy.
I exploit this quasi-experimental setup to evaluate the impact of local autonomy
on educational quality. I find that autonomy was beneficial for municipalities
that were highly developed at the time of the reform, but the impact was nega-
tive for low-developed ones, increasing inequality across regions. These results
sound a note of caution about the potential consequences of decentralization
reforms, in educational contexts similar to the Colombian one.
Chapter 3 is coauthored with Fabio Sánchez Torres at the University of Los
Andes, and looks at how quality assurance mechanisms in the careers of pub-
lic school teachers have affected student performance in Colombia. The main
novelties consist in a selective entry examination, a probation period and per-
manent evaluation processes. We find that teachers who operate under the new
regulation noticeably improve pupils’ achievement with respect to colleagues
who follow the old rules, which feature very few incentives for teaching quality.
Our findings may provide education policy guidance to several Latin American
countries, in which current teacher regulations resemble the former Colombian
one.
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Chapter 1
Sibling Effects in Cognitive Achievement:
Are Smart Brothers and Sisters Good for You?
Abstract
In this paper I investigate whether children’s cognitive achievement is influenced by the
cognitive achievement of their siblings. I apply system GMM to estimate a dynamic
model of cognitive skill production. I allow for endogeneity of sibling performance
and of other regressors, for reciprocal influence between younger and older sibling,
for unobserved individual and family effects, and for state dependence of cognitive
achievement. I find evidence for positive and significant sibling effects on both verbal
reasoning and mathematics test scores, with results consistent across the two skills. The
results support theories of cumulative achievement processes, as current achievements
are shown to depend on past ones. Influence goes from older siblings to younger ones
and viceversa, in contradiction with the assumption of unidirectional effect from old
to young, which underlies identification in related studies.
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1 Introduction
One of the most active debates in the child development literature revolves around defining
the elements that concur to the production of cognitive skills in early years of life. Endow-
ments at birth, parental investment, family environment and early schooling are among the
most widely discussed factors. In this paper I focus on the role of siblings. I investigate
whether the cognitive performance of siblings influences a child’s achievements. Numerous
studies in sociology and developmental psychology show that children are more responsive
to siblings than to other peers such as friends or classmates1. Nevertheless, the amount of
Economics research dedicated to peer effects among siblings is surprisingly small.
It is helpful to clarify what kind of peer effects this piece of work aims at identifying. We are
dealing with what Manski [1993] defines as “endogenous peer effects”, i.e. those occurring
when individual outcomes are influenced by the outcomes or the behavior of peers2. This
definition encompasses direct and indirect channels of influence. Siblings could influence
each other directly through teaching or imitation, but also indirectly in several manners.
The way a child’s cognitive achievement compares to his sibling’s may modify parental
investment behavior. Having an ambitious and high achieving sibling might lead to a
higher number of books being kept at home. The set of potential channels of influence is
large, and it is not within the scope of this paper to identify which ones are operating. Data
at hand allow me to rule out the channel of parental investment feedbacks; beyond that,
all channels through which the level of cognitive achievement of the sibling may influence
a child are included in the estimated effect.
1See for example Ardelt and Day [2002], who find that older siblings have a stronger effect than peers and
parents on deviant behavior of adolescents. Also Azmitia and Hesser [1993] show through an experimental
setting that younger children are more likely to imitate and learn a task from older siblings than from older
peers or parents, and obtain better results if they do so.
2The challenge is to detach endogenous effects from other two categories of peer influences: “exogenous
effects” and “correlated effects”. Exogenous effects measure how the characteristics of the peer group
influence the individual outcome. In the case of siblings, relevant characteristics could be the sibling’s age,
gender, birth order, health. Correlated effects instead represent the similarity in behavior that is explained
by background characteristics and environmental factors that peers share. In the case of siblings, we can
think of family effects: growing up in the same family environment drives correlation in life outcomes.
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Two are the main observations that generate interest for the results of the exercise I here
propose. Firstly, do policies which are aimed at improving educational achievement of a
specific population of children have spillover effects on other siblings back in the households?
In other words, is there a “social multiplier” effect in place in this context? The answer
is highly relevant for program budgeting and cost-benefit analyses. Secondly, siblings are
frequently used as control groups to evaluate the effectiveness of policy interventions3. If
performance spillovers do actually take place, this strategy would turn out to be flawed.
Both the outcome I am considering and the identification methodology I am employing
introduce novelty to the research on endogenous sibling effects. I carry out the empirical
analysis on a large samples of US families, using longitudinal data from the National Longi-
tudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort (NLSY79). The outcome I look at is the performance
in cognitive tests measuring skills in math and verbal knowledge, at ages between 3 and 14.
Early results of this sort are well known to have strong predictive power on future academic
and life outcomes, and are therefore highly valuable as targets for policy intervention. I
explore how test scores of a child are impacted by the test scores that the sibling achieved
in the same test session. The choice of considering contemporaneous score achievements,
and not achievements distant in time, is motivated by the fact that the strongest channels
of sibling influence during childhood are everyday interaction and reciprocal observation,
rather than memories or past records4. These test scores are taken as measures of the
children’s cognitive ability in the areas of verbal reasoning and in mathematics. The scope
of the exercise is to isolate the influence of the ability of one child on the ability of the
other, removing confounding factors such as family effects, characteristics of the sibling
other than his or her cognitive performance, and parental investment. If not appropriately
controlled for, these and other elements give rise to the issues of endogeneity that typically
affect peer and sibling studies. Beyond exploiting the rich information provided by the
3See for example Currie and Thomas [1995] and Garces et al. [2002], evaluating the impact of the Head
Start program on later life outcomes.
4For more formal discussions on this topic, see for example Green et al. [1994] with experimental
evidence on the high time discounting of children, and the papers they cite.
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NLYS79 panel, I employ a system GMM estimation methodology to overcome these issues.
Importantly, this methodology also allows to account for a dynamic skill formation process,
i.e. for the fact that past achievement plays a structural role in explaining achievement
today. The assumptions underlying identification are different and less restrictive than the
ones made in related studies. I find evidence for positive, large and significant influence
between siblings’ cognitive performances, for both numerical and verbal skills. Influence
goes both from the older sibling to the younger and from the younger to the older.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 places the paper in the context of
the existing related literature; Section 3 describes the data resources used for the empirical
exercise; Section 4 addresses the empirical strategy used to identify sibling influence; Section
5 presents and discusses the estimation results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Research on cognitive skill formation has been attracting increasing numbers of contribu-
tions in Economics, from the earliest works of Becker and Lewis [1973] and Becker and
Tomes [1986] to present, witnessing continuous improvement especially on the empirical
side, thanks to the progress in econometric methods and to the increasing quality of avail-
able datasets. In recent years, Cunha and Heckman [2009] and Aizer and Cunha [2012]
study how birth endowments and later investments interact in the production of human
capital in childhood. Todd and Wolpin [2007] test several specifications of skill production
functions, accounting for family unobservables and history dependence. History dependence
of cognitive achievements, i.e. the fact that past achievements influence current ones, is
nowadays extensively supported by the literature on life cycle skill formation. Back in the
late Seventies, Boardman and Murnane [1979] present and estimate a model featuring cu-
mulative patterns in cognitive achievement. More recently, multiple pieces of research by
Heckman [2000, 2006] bring new evidence on the fact that skill formation is a dynamic
process in which early inputs strongly affect the productivity of later inputs. Cunha and
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Heckman [2007, 2008] and Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) formulate and estimate
multistage production functions for children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills, showing
that the return to cognitive investment during a given period of the child’s life depends on
the skill stock inherited from the former period. The estimation method I adopt in this
paper allows for dependence of current achievement on its past value.
The role of peers is one of the most recent aspects that research on cognitive achievement
has been looking at. I will omit the discussion of literature on exogenous and correlated peer
effects, and focus instead on contributions exploring endogenous effects, as my empirical
exercise does. Sacerdote [2001] exploits the random-pairing of Dartmouth college students
into rooms, and proposes a structural model to isolate causal influences between roommates’
grades; he finds evidence for (modest) positive peer influence between GPAs of students
sharing the room. In a similar paper, Zimmerman [2003] proposes evidence for not large
but significant effects between students’ SAT scores; in particular he finds stronger effects
for verbal achievement scores, with respect to mathematics. Effects of larger magnitude
are reported by Carrell et al. [2009], who use data on US Air Force Academy students and
find that peer results do significantly affect individual academic achievement. Patacchini
et al. [2011] exploit friend nominations in AddHealth data and find that friends signifi-
cantly influence the length of each others’s periods of education. Zimmer and Toma [2000],
Hoxby [2000], Betts and Zau [2002], Hanushek et al. [2003], Robertson and Symons [2003],
Arcidiacono and Nicholson [2005] and Vigdor and Nechyba [2007] are further examples of
recent studies addressing the influence of schoolmates’ abilities and achievements on own
achievement. For additional models, estimation techniques and empirical findings about
peer effects in education, one can refer to the excellent and thorough review by Sacerdote
[2011].
We finally come to the sparse literature that has attempted to isolate endogenous sibling
influences. Powers and Cherng-tay Hsueh [1997] look at how the probability of premarital
childbearing of young women is influenced by the occurrence of the same event for their
elder sisters; the effect they isolate is positive and significant. Ouyang [2004] and Altonji
5
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et al. [2010] focus on risky teenage behaviors: their results indicate that having an older
sibling who smokes, engages in unprotected sexual activities or consumes alcohol or drugs
increases the probability for an adolescent to behave similarly. Oettinger [2000] finds that
the probability of graduating from high school on time is higher if older siblings have
achieved the same goal before.
To some up, one strand of research has investigated how the cognitive performance of peers
such as friends, classmates and college roommates influences individual cognitive perfor-
mance. Another strand has looked at how specific behaviors of siblings influence a child’s
own behavior. In this paper I fill the gap between the two branches and investigate whether
the cognitive performance of siblings has a causal effect on a child’s own achievement.
3 Data
3.1 NLSY79 (National Longitudinal Survey of Youth)
The NLSY79 5 is an ongoing longitudinal project that follows the lives of a sample of Ameri-
can youth born between 1957-64. The panel collects a vast and detailed range of information
about the families: demographics, education, employment, income, wealth, housing, expen-
ditures, health, marriage, childbearing, and several other topics. The NLSY79 Child and
Young Adult Cohort6 follows biological children of the women in the NLSY79. Data are
now available from 1986 to 2010, with 13 survey rounds having been administered to the
child sample. These look at individuals that had not turned 15 by the end of the calendar
year in which each survey is conducted. Cognitive assessments of these children are taken
in the form of Peabody Individual Achievement Tests (PIAT), administered to individuals
aged 5 to 14. I examine the results of the PIAT Math and the PIAT Reading tests; PIAT
5Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
cohort, 1979-2010 (rounds 1-24) [computer file]. Produced and distributed by the Center for Human
Resource Research, The Ohio State University. Columbus, OH: 2012.
6Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, and National Institute for Child Health and
Human Development. Children of the NLSY79, 1979-2010 [computer file]. Produced and distributed by
the Center for Human Resource Research, The Ohio State University. Columbus, OH: 2012.
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scores are standardized in order to capture individual performance compared to the average
performance of the age group. I select sibling pairs for which at least 2 rounds of results
are available. I could make use of a final sample of about 3,900 children7. for the empirical
analysis.
3.2 Relevant information
The Choice of Sibling Pairs
The NLSY study observes all children in the household. In 38% of the cases, families were
2-children families. In 33% of the cases, a third sibling was born during the observation
span; 17% of the families recorded 4 children; 12% recorded more. For the main empirical
analysis I associate to each child only his or her closest-in-age sibling. Dealing with multiple
siblings complicates model and estimation to great extent. One might have concerns about
confounding effects coming from the influence of the siblings excluded from estimation;
to placate these concerns I run a sensitivity analysis on a reduced sample of 2-children
families only, which I present in the Appendix. The reduced specification implies a major
sample reduction without major changes in the estimated coefficients. Full family size is
also included among the control variables in the analysis.
Parental investment: The HOME score
A large theoretical and empirical literature shows that parental investment is a crucial factor
in the production of cognitive skills in children. The Home Observation for Measurement
of the Environment (HOME) Inventory is one of the most prominently used instruments to
measure parental investment. The HOME score is constructed using both mother reports
and interviewer observations about the overall quality of the home environment, emotional
and verbal responsiveness of the mother, maternal acceptance and involvement with the
7This figure is reduced to about 3,400 for the Reading test, due to a larger number of missing values
for these results.
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child, organization of the environment, presence of materials for learning, and variety of
stimulation8. The HOME measure is taken for each child in the household individually,
at each survey round, along with the cognitive tests and the household interview. It has
been employed in literature to investigate intrahousehold differences in parental invest-
ment - attributing these to gender, birth endowments, disabilities, different levels of cogni-
tive achievement, and to study the effects of such investments (see for example Todd and
Wolpin [2007], Cunha and Heckman [2008], Coneus et al. [2010], Zuppann [2013]). Given
the widespread acceptance of its reliability and accuracy9, the HOME measurement has
been introduced in all major household interviews that touch issues such as intrahousehold
relationships, child development, and child welfare - including the NLSY79. In my analysis
I use the HOME score as a control for parental investment, to account for potential changes
in attitude of the parents towards one or both siblings, and to be thus able to exclude the
parental investment channel from the influence between siblings.
4 Empirical Specification and Estimation Method
In his 1993 seminal work on peer effects, Manski shows the general conditions under which
we have a chance to isolate endogenous peer effects from exogenous and correlated ones.
He concludes his theoretical analysis claiming “there may be realistic prospects for inference
on endogenous effects if the attributes defining reference groups and those directly affecting
outcomes are moderately related”. This means that the two sets of attributes should be
neither statistically unrelated nor a function of each other. Moreover he adds that the
composition of reference (peer) groups needs to be known a priori, and not to be extrap-
olated from the data. In the setup of my analysis, I am considering a well defined and a
priori known reference group: siblings in the household. The first condition identified by
Manski is also satisfied: there is a partial relation between the attributes characterizing
8Description from “NLS Handbook, 2005, Chapter 4: Children of the NLSY79”.
9Mott [2004] provides a valuable review of the intensive usage that social science research, and especially
child development studies, have made of the HOME scale over the past years.
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the reference group (the children in the household) and the set of attributes that directly
impact on individual test scores. In fact, all siblings in the household are characterized by
some shared family characteristics (e.g. mother education and family income), but there
are other variables which impact individual outcomes without being systematically related
to the reference group (e.g. each child’s birth endowments, ability and health dynamics).
As a result, the two sets of attributes are correlated but not functionally dependent from
each other.
After having established that identification of sibling influence is possible, I will proceed
looking at which are the factors that make it challenging. The results of an ordinary least
squares regression of own achievement on sibling’s achievement is biased by the following
factors:
1. Reverse causality. The influence between the two children may flow in both directions,
which would lead to an overestimation of the true sibling effect.
2. Family effects. Both siblings are influenced by some common characteristics and by
dynamics affecting the family as a whole. This fact inflates naive estimations of the
sibling effect, as it introduces spurious correlation between children’s outcomes.
3. Individual fixed effects. Each child has inborn characteristics, such as ability and
personality traits, which are unobserved and potentially correlated with observed
regressors. As a result, OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent, with the direction
of the bias depending on the sign of such correlations.
4. Dependence on past achievement. As discussed above in Section 2, theoretical and
empirical evidence shows that past cognitive achievement plays a structural role in
explaining current achievement. OLS estimation of a linear model featuring an au-
toregressive term is biased - as well as fixed effects estimation, especially with short
panels.
Equation (1) shows the model I estimate in the empirical analysis; it is written out for one
9
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of the two siblings and it is specular for the other.
yaft = ρy
a
f(t−1) + βy
b
ft +
I∑
i=1
γix
a
ift +
J∑
j=I+1
γjx
b
jft +
K∑
k=J+1
γkxkft + α
a
f + 
a
ft (1)
where index t denotes time; index f denotes families; indexes a and b distinguish the
two siblings; yaft and y
b
ft are current cognitive achievements; y
a
f(t−1) is lagged cognitive
achievement; xaft and x
b
ft are observed time-varying individual characteristics of the two
siblings; xft are observed time-varying family characteristics; αaf represent observed and
unobserved, time-invariant, individual and family characteristics; aft is the idiosyncratic
shock. The xaft, x
b
ft and xft are not necessarily exogenous: they might be predetermined
(uncorrelated with the contemporaneous error term, but correlated with past ones) or
endogenous (correlated also with the contemporaneous error term).
I estimate the model applying the system GMM (SGMM) estimator, whose final version
is the result of the contributions by Arellano and Bond [1991], Arellano and Bover [1995]
and Blundell and Bond [1998], to which the reader may refer for thorough discussions - as
well as to the excellent pedagogical papers by Roodman (Roodman [2009a] and Roodman
[2009b]) . The estimator’s native field of application is the short and wide panel data case,
i.e. a situation in which few time periods are observed for a large number of individuals
(I face T = 13 and N=3,900 using the NLSY). The SGMM estimation procedure can be
concisely summarized as follows:
• The equation specified by the researcher is estimated combining two different proce-
dures: I will refer to the two procedures as “in deviations” and “in levels”.
• “In deviations” procedure. A forward orthogonal deviations transform is applied to
10
4 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION METHOD
the equation10, thus eliminating fixed effects from the error term11. The right hand
side variables that are believed to be endogenous after the transformation are in-
strumented. The matrix of instruments is composed of contemporaneous and lagged
values of exogenous regressors12; lagged values of predetermined regressors; lags 2
and deeper of the endogenous regressors13. The set of moment conditions underlying
this instrumenting procedure is14:
E
[
yf(t−1)∗ft
]
= 0 for 2 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 , i.e. (T − 1) cond. (2)
where y indicates any endogenous regressor. The assumption needed for 2 to hold
is absence of serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term ft. If ft follows an
AR(1) process of the sort ft = ρf(t−1) +wft, then yf,t−1 is correlated to ft through
f(t−1). Then yf,t−1 is also correlated to ∗ft and condition 2 fails. Valid instruments
are then yt−2 and deeper lags.
• “In levels” procedure. The equation is kept untransformed, and the right hand side
variables that are potentially correlated with the error term through fixed effects
are instrumented. The matrix of instruments is composed of differences and lagged
differences of exogenous and predetermined regressors12, and of lagged differences of
the endogenous regressors. The fixed effect components are absent in these differenced
10To each of the first T − 1 observations, we subtract the mean of the remaining future observations
available in the panel[Arellano and Bover, 1995]. Formally, x∗ft = xft −
∑T
i=t+1
xi1(xi 6=.)∑T
i=t+1
1(xi 6=.) , where the function
1 (xi 6= .) assumes value 1 when xi is nonmissing and 0 otherwise. This method preserves lack of correlation
among the transformed variables if the original variables are not autocorrelated and have constant variance
(Arellano and Honore [2001], page 3256) and minimizes data loss in case of missing observations across the
panel.
11An alternative method is to first-difference the equation. Due to the fact that only 3 waves of Child
Development Supplement data are available from the PSID dataset, I minimize data loss by choosing the
orthogonal deviations transform for my analysis, thus I focus on that option in the rest of the discussion.
12and of other external instruments, if available
13Specifically, the instrument set is the standard one proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988)
Holtz-Eakin et al. [1988].
14In the case of first-differencing the conditions would be: E
[
yf(t−l)∆ft
]
= 0for each t ≥ 3, l ≥
2, i.e.(T − 2) (T − 1) /2cond.
11
4.1 Assumptions 4 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION METHOD
regressors, making them uncorrelated with the present error term and thus valid
instruments. The set of moment conditions underlying this procedure is:
E [∆yit−1it] = 0 for eacht ≥ 3 , i.e. (T − 2) cond. (3)
Call yi1 the first observed individual outcome. Call y¯i the value to which each in-
dividual outcome process converges over time. Condition 3 holds if the deviations
of yi1 from y¯i are not correlated with y¯i itself, or in other words with the individual
fixed effect. This assumption is formalized in Blundell and Bond [1998] and further
discussed in the next subsection.
The combination of these two procedures makes the SGMM estimator suitable for empir-
ical specifications featuring fixed effects, state dependence, regressors that are endogenous
because of reverse causality. SGMM coefficient estimates have causal interpretation, given
that assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Compared to standard in-differences estimators such as
the Arellano and Bond [1991] GMM estimator, SGMM has the advantages of mitigating
the weak instrument problem of which the former suffer15, of increasing efficiency of the
estimation and of allowing the estimation of coefficients on time invariant regressors.
4.1 Assumptions
Attempts to answer questions similar to the one I am addressing here have been based on
a diverse set of assumptions. Ouyang [2004] and Altonji et al. [2010] assume that influence
goes only from the older to the younger sibling and exclude the other direction. Ouyang also
overlooks the presence of individual fixed effects; Altonji assumes away parental investment
dynamics. Oettinger [2000] does not use panel data, omits fixed effects of any sort and
uses child-specific characteristic to instrument graduation probability. Here below I briefly
15See the discussion in Blundell and Bond [1998].
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discuss the assumptions on which my identification strategy is based.
4.1.1 No residual serial correlation
For condition (2) to hold and the “in deviations” procedure to be valid, there should be no
serial correlation in the residual error term, conditional on observables and after purging out
the fixed effect. The assumption will hold if we are effective in eliminating fixed effects and
controlling for the factors that are likely to provoke correlation over time in outcomes. The
validity of the assumption can be tested through a post-estimation AR test. An AR(2) test
on the differenced residuals will spot AR(1) relationships in levels. I show the test results
for the NLSY79 data in Section 5. The null hypothesis of no residual serial correlation is
not rejected at the standard significance levels.
4.1.2 No correlation between initial deviations and individual fixed effects
For condition (3) to hold and the “in levels” procedure to be valid, we need a restriction on
the outcomes observed at the first period. For a formal discussion, see Blundell and Bond
[1998]. The underlying concept is quite straightforward. Say each child has a long term
outcome to which he/she converges over time, and this long term level is influenced by
the individual fixed effect. It should not be the case that the deviation of the first-period
outcomes from the individual long term level is correlated to the individual fixed effect.
Violation of this condition would reintroduce the fixed effect into the differenced regressors
used as instruments, as the growth rate over time (and thus the differences) would correlate
with the fixed effect through the first-period deviation. In fact this condition is not deemed
restrictive in our setup. Some children will have a lower overtime baseline outcome, and
other children will have a higher one. There is no research evidence or intuitive reason
to think that one of these groups will be further away from its baseline than the other
group at the first wave of assessments. Postestimation overidentification tests that verify
the validity of the set of differenced instruments are reported in the result tables.
13
4.1 Assumptions 4 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION METHOD
4.1.3 No residual correlation across individuals
The SGMM estimator assumes no correlation across individuals in the idiosyncratic dis-
turbances. Both the AR test for residual serial correlation and the computation of robust
standard errors on coefficient estimates rely on this assumption. The inclusion of time dum-
mies in the model should suffice to alleviate concerns about correlation across families, given
they are randomly sampled across the US. Somewhat more worrisome is the possible resid-
ual pairwise correlation between siblings. Correlation deriving from time-invariant factors
is wiped out in the SGMM estimation procedure; what remains to discuss are time-variant
shocks that are common to the two siblings and not eliminated along with the fixed effects.
This is where the high quality of datasets such as the NLSY79 becomes relevant. We can
observe changes in family composition, relationship status of parents, income dynamics,
health of parents, neighborhood ratings16. If we believe that these measures are able to ac-
count for the effects of shocks affecting wealth and income (job losses, financial fortunes or
misfortunes), the family history (births, deaths, adoptions, parents splitting up), in health
and in the living environment, we should be able to trust the share of residual unobserved
correlation to be reassuringly small.
4.1.4 Which regressors are exogenous, predetermined, endogenous?
Exogenous regressors are uncorrelated with current and past error terms. Predetermined
regressors are uncorrelated with present errors, but might be correlated with past ones.
Endogenous regressors might be correlated with present and past error terms. The clas-
sification of regressors into the categories of exogenous, predetermined and endogenous
determines how they are handled during the SGMM estimation procedure. Specifically, it
determines how they contribute to the instrument matrix - as described in the SGMM sum-
mary in Section 4. Misclassifying a regressor as exogenous or predetermined when it is in
fact endogenous, or exogenous when it is in fact predetermined, means introducing invalid
16For the sake of simplicity, health of parents and neighborhood ratings have been left out in the final
specification of the model, as results turned out to be insensitive to these factors.
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instruments into the SGMM instrument matrices. The other direction of misclassification,
i.e. classifying an exogenous or predetermined factor as endogenous, or an exogenous as
predetermined, implies unnecessary loss of valid instruments but no bias is introduced. I
adopt a conservative classification, to avoid invalidating the set of instruments. I classify as
exogenous gender, ethnicity and the time dummies. The level of education of the mother
and the lagged test score are predetermined. Finally, I classify as endogenous the perfor-
mance of the sibling, health indicators, family composition variables, relationship status,
income measures, and HOME scores. The results of the post estimation overidentification
tests provide additional support for the validity of these choices.
5 Results
5.1 Verbal Skills Achievement Test
Table (1) shows the estimation results for the Verbal achievement tests. The first column
shows the SGMM estimation results, and is followed by Fixed Effects and pooled OLS
results.
I find that a child’s performance in the verbal skill tests is positively affected by a higher
performance of his or her sibling. The estimations on the two datasets yield similar estima-
tions of the coefficient of interest17: a child’s test performance is increased by around 0.40
standard points when the performance of the sibling is increased by one standard point.
I find evidence for positive state dependence in the test performance, a fact that provides
additional empirical support to the theories of cumulative cognitive skill formation. I find
no evidence towards significant age gap effects. Other stylized facts the estimation meets
are that females achieve better verbal scores than males; blacks and hispanics do worse on
average; better health ratings induce better cognitive performance.
Notice that the fixed effects estimations yield negative state dependence, and an estimated
17Recall that the results of both tests are standardized, and thus the sizes of the estimated coefficients
are comparable across the two panels.
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sibling effect half the size with respect to the SGMM results. As demonstrated in the early
work by Nickell [1981], applying fixed effects to short, dynamic panels with a large number
of individuals induces significant bias in the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable.
The bias is shown to be invariably negative when the structural state dependence is posi-
tive. Also, the fixed effects model does not adequately handle the issues of inverse causality
between the results of the two siblings. The pooled OLS estimation, which ignores alto-
gether the presence of fixed effects, performs somewhat better and yields state dependence
of the correct sign, but smaller coefficients on the sibling effect.
Table (1) also reports the results of the overidentifying restrictions tests on the validity
of the instruments used in the SGMM procedure, and the AR tests for residual autocor-
relation18. The Hansen overidentification test reports on whether the instruments, as a
group, appear exogenous19. The Difference-in-Hansen tests considers two subgroups of in-
struments separately: differenced instruments that are used for the equation in levels, and
the levels instruments used for the transformed equation20. The outcomes of all three tests
induce confidence in the validity of the instruments used. As to the test for residual auto-
correlation, recall from section 4.1.1 that we expect to find autocorrelation of first order,
but do not wish to find autocorrelation of second order. Autocorrelation of second order
in differences implies autocorrelation in levels, and this would discredit the validity of the
instruments used in relation with the transformed equation. Gratifyingly, the test results
meet both the expectations of presence of AR(1) and absence of AR(2) in first differences.
18Recall the panel from the PSID is too short to obtain results for these tests.
19Note: Roodman [2009b] warns about the risks of relying on the results of the Hansen test without
further inquiry. The test is weakened when the number of instruments used in the SGMM procedure is high
relative to the sample size, leading to systematic under-rejection of the null of valid instruments. Literature
does not provide a commonly accepted rule of thumb for a “safe” ratio between sample size and instrument
count, but the figures that have come into consideration by Roodman and others are well below my ratios
of 11 (NLSY79 sample) and 44 (PSID sample), which thus appear adequate even by conservative standards.
20The test compares the values that the Hansen statistic takes with and without the relevant set of
instruments. The Difference-in-Hansen test on differenced instruments is indicative about the validity of
the assumption underlying the “in levels” part of the SGMM estimation, i.e. that initial deviations from
long run outcomes are not residually correlated with individual fixed effects.
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Table 1: Verbal Skills
SGMM Fixed Effects Pooled OLS
Lagged score 0.189∗∗∗ -0.351∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Sib.score 0.404∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Sibsc.*Agegap 0.001∗ -0.003 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes
Family vars Yes Yes Yes
Health, HOME Yes Yes Yes
SS 3,424 3,424 3,424
Fstat p-value 0.000
N. of instruments 367
Hansen overid 308.504
(pval) (0.910)
Diff.H, levels 82.648
(p-val) (0.459)
Diff.H, transformed 246.009
(p-value) (0.887)
AR(2) in fd -1.610
(p-value) (0.107)
5.2 Math Skills Achievement Test
Table (2) reports the estimation results for the Mathematics achievement tests. The result
patterns are the same as for the verbal skill tests, and the size of the sibling effect is of the
same magnitude as the one that was found for the verbal tests.
Positive dependence on past achievement is again confirmed, and no age gap effects are
spotted. Racial minorities perform less well and better health status has positive influence
on results. Girls appear to do worse than boys in mathematics, while they were better in
verbal skills.
The results of the Fixed Effects and Pooled OLS estimations follow the same patterns as in
the case of verbal skills: state dependence appears negative using fixed effects; the pooled
OLS does not perform badly but consistently underestimates the coefficients on sibling
performance.
The Hansen overidentification test on the instrument set as a whole supports instrument
validity. The result of the difference-in-Hansen test for the levels equation is less supportive,
while the instrument set for transformed equation does not give reason to worry. Also the
result on the autocorrelation test does again meet our positive expectations.
17
5.3 General remarks on the results 5 RESULTS
Table 2: Mathematics Skills
SGMM Fixed Effects Pooled OLS
Lagged score 0.228∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Sib.score 0.359∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01)
Sibsc.*Agegap -0.000 -0.002 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes
Family vars Yes Yes Yes
Health, HOME Yes Yes Yes
SS 3,948 3,948 3,948
Fstat p-value 0.000
N. of instruments 372
Hansen overid 364.352
(pval) (0.250)
Diff.H, levels 104.807
(p-val) (0.053)
Diff.H, transformed 299.191
(p-value) (0.183)
AR(2) in fd -1.337
(p-value) (0.181)
5.3 General remarks on the results
As noted by Roodman [2009b], estimators that employ exclusively “internal” instruments
to achieve identification (in this case, lagged levels and differences of the regressors) should
always be treated with caution and preferably limited to cases in which alternative strategies
are unavailable. The identification of endogenous sibling influences arguably represents one
of these cases. The environment we face when we approach the research question brings
about challenges that the SGMM estimator is able to overcome, under specified conditions.
Overall the estimation results are consistent across the two skill categories and across the
two samples employed, which induces confidence about their robustness. Even though
not always completely satisfactory, in general the postestimation tests on the validity of
the instruments used in the SGMM procedure appear to support the soundness of the
identification obtained.
Table (??) in the Appendix shows the SGMM results for reduced samples of 2-children
families only. We can see that the coefficients of interest do not vary by much with respect
to the full sample specifications. Two-children families account for somewhat more than
38% of the full sample a priori.
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5.4 Younger Vs. Older Siblings
In this section I look at whether influence in cognitive achievement goes only from the
older brother to the younger, or flows also into the opposite direction. As anticipated in the
review of Section 2, the assumption of unidirectional influence from the older to the younger
sibling has been used by some authors to achieve identification of the sibling effect. The
assumption seems somewhat dubious, especially in light of research on child development
by sociologists and educational scientists. Among these, experimental evidence by Azmitia
and Hesser [1993] shows that the performance of older siblings in performing a task is
positively affected when younger siblings are eager to learn and prompt them to explaining
it in detail. Also Hartup [1989] describes how influence is bidirectional between young and
old, and how it depends on respective ability levels. More in general, we would expect
interactions between individuals to have repercussions on all participants, and not on one
party alone. Table (3) shows estimations for verbal and mathematics skills, with Panel A
looking at the effect of the older sibling on the younger and Panel B looking at the opposite
direction. The sample sizes obviously drop with respect to previous estimations, due to the
split into younger and older siblings21. The main finding is that results show significant
influence both from old to young and from young to old, the former being larger than
the latter. Regarding the postestimation tests on the validity of instruments, it is good to
notice that the ratios ’sample size to instrument count’ are reduced due to the sample splits.
Nevertheless, since all test results are comfortably above acceptance levels, we should be
able to be once again faithful about the reliability of the estimations. In conclusion, from
the analysis I drew evidence for bidirectional influence on cognitive achievement between
younger and older siblings.
21The PSID sample is evenly split into two, as only two children per household are recorded - one is the
younger and the other is the older. Recall that the NLSY79 follows instead all children in the household,
and I associated to each child his/her closest-in-age sibling. If there are more than 2 children in the family,
the number of children who are associated to a younger sibling and the number of those associated to an
older sibling are not necessarily equal and depend on the birth spacing patterns.
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Table 3: Influences from Older to Younger, and viceversa
Panel A: Older on Younger Panel B: Younger on Older
Verbal Math Verbal Math
Lagged score 0.177∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Sib.score 0.342∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.146∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Sibsc.*Agegap 0.002∗∗ 0.001 -0.000 -0.001∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family vars Yes Yes Yes Yes
Health, HOME Yes Yes Yes Yes
SS 2,130 2,515 1,262 1,401
Fstat p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N. of instruments 364 368 330 341
Hansen overid 312.965 347.300 298.900 309.892
(pval) (0.851) (0.440) (0.603) (0.586)
Diff.H, levels 76.006 103.535 77.783 86.054
(p-val) (0.606) (0.046) (0.329) (0.141)
Diff.H, transformed 257.708 288.773 236.052 260.532
(p-value) (0.738) (0.286) (0.664) (0.427)
AR(2) in fd -1.261 -1.588 -0.956 -0.877
(p-value) (0.207) (0.112) (0.339) (0.380)
6 Conclusion
Identifying if and how siblings influence each other is always a challenging econometric
exercise. Identification is hampered by inverse causality between the outcomes of the two
siblings and by presence of individual and family fixed effects. When cognitive achievement
is the outcome of interest, we also have to allow for dependence of current achievements on
past achievements. External instruments are hardly available in this framework, as most
circumstances potentially changing cognitive progress of a child would affect the other chil-
dren in the household too. In this paper I turned to the System GMM (SGMM) estimator,
which combines estimation in levels and estimation in orthogonal deviations, using differ-
ences and levels of past values of the regressors as “internal” instruments. Even though
estimators of this sort should be handled with care, I find that the framework of my anal-
ysis complies with the assumptions underpinning valid identification through the SGMM
procedure. These assumptions are different and arguably less restrictive than those used in
past related studies, which include the absence of fixed effects and unidirectional influence
from the older sibling to the younger. Given that the SGMM assumptions hold, the esti-
mator is fit to overcome the aforementioned obstacles to the identification of endogenous
sibling effects.
The estimation results obtained on verbal and mathematics skills are consistent between
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each other. I find that a child’s test performance is increased by 0.35-0.40 standard points
when the performance of the sibling is increased by one standard point. The effect is larger
from older siblings to younger ones, but it is present and significant also from younger to
older. The results also show support for the theories of cumulative dynamics in cognitive
achievement, as current score achievements are revealed to positively depend on past ones.
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A Appendix
A.1 Two-Children Families Only
Table 4: Verbal Skills, 2-children families
SGMM Fixed Effects Pooled OLS
Lagged score 0.110∗ -0.414∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Sib.score 0.485∗∗∗ 0.151 0.177∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.11) (0.03)
Sibsc.*Agegap -0.001∗ -0.002 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes
Family vars Yes Yes Yes
Health, HOME Yes Yes Yes
SS 1,101 1,101 1,101
Fstat p-value 0.000
N. of instruments 329
Hansen overid 300.267
(pval) (0.566)
Diff.H, levels 79.291
(p-val) (0.345)
Diff.H, transformed 240.021
(p-value) (0.542)
AR(2) in fd -0.949
(p-value) (0.343)
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Table 5: Math Skills, 2-children families
SGMM Fixed Effects Pooled OLS
Lagged score 0.196∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Sib.score 0.317∗∗∗ 0.068 0.187∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.02)
Sibsc.*Agegap -0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes
Family vars Yes Yes Yes
Health, HOME Yes Yes Yes
SS 1,302 1,302 1,302
Fstat p-value 0.000
N. of instruments 334
Hansen overid 298.509
(pval) (0.655)
Diff.H, levels 79.947
(p-val) (0.327)
Diff.H, transformed 241.436
(p-value) (0.605)
AR(2) in fd 0.064
(p-value) (0.949)
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Chapter 2
Cities Drifting Apart:
Heterogeneous Outcomes of Decentralizing Public Education
Abstract
Looking at the decentralized provision of public education in a middle income coun-
try, this paper estimates the impact of local autonomy on service quality, finding large
heterogeneity in the effect across different levels of local development. Colombian mu-
nicipalities were assigned to administer their public education service autonomously
solely on the basis of whether they exceeded the 100 thousand inhabitants thresh-
old. Exploiting this discontinuity, I estimate the impact that autonomy has had on
student test scores across municipalities, using a regression discontinuity design and
fixed-effects regression on a discontinuity sample. I find a test score gap arising between
autonomous municipalities in the top quartile and those in the bottom quartile of the
development range, in a trend that reinforces over time. From analysis of detailed
municipal balance sheet data, I show that the autonomous high-developed municipal-
ities invest in education more than the ad hoc transfers they receive, supplementing
these with own financial resources. Indicators of municipal administration quality also
show significant differences between the two groups of cities, helping to explain the
education outcome patterns.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
Decentralization of public service provision has been at the top of policy agendas in nu-
merous countries over the last decades, involving services such as education, health, public
transport and the supply of energy, water and sewerage systems. In developing and middle-
income countries, responsibilities are often handled from a central or regional level down
to municipalities1. Such reform are expected to yield welfare benefits through better lo-
cal preference matching, higher governor accountability and increases in the efficiency of
service delivery2. Welfare losses may instead derive from inadequate management skills of
local authorities, increases in administrative and coordination costs, corruption among lo-
cal bureaucrats or local elites resource capture3. These positive and negative repercussions
may materialize in different proportions across different regions in the reforming coun-
try, giving rise or exacerbating regional inequalities. In this paper I show that entrusting
Colombian municipalities with managerial autonomy over local public education has yielded
heterogeneous results on local educational outcomes, depending on the level of municipal
development at the time of the responsibility takeover.
In this empirical analysis I benefit of an unusually clean decentralization criterion: auton-
omy over the education service was assigned to cities solely depending on whether they
exceeded the 100 thousand inhabitants threshold. This decision rule relieves the analy-
sis from the issues that typically hinder identification of the effects of higher autonomy:
non-random selection into autonomy by local authorities, and other nationwide phenomena
occurring along with decentralization. In this way, this study introduces innovation to ex-
isting literature on the topic. A second valuable aspect of studying the Colombian case is
that it yields insight into a context in which decentralization was purely administrative, and
not mingled, as it often happens, with changes on the fiscal or political front: managerial
authority was transferred, but local taxation and local representation were left unchanged.
Using panel data on standardized student test scores over a period of 10 years after the
reform, I show that higher autonomy has proven beneficial for highly developed municipal-
ities, but not so for less developed municipalities. Average test scores in high-developed au-
tonomous municipalities have started to significantly exceed those of their non-autonomous
1Recent examples are the experiences of Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia in Latin Amer-
ica; India, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines in Southeast Asia; South Africa, Senegal, Ethiopia and
Uganda in Africa; Ukraine, Serbia and Bulgaria in Eastern Europe
2On informational advantage and heterogeneity in preferences, see seminal work by Musgrave [1959]
and Oates [1972]. On accountability, monitoring and elections see Crook and Manor [1998], Manor [1999]
and Blair [2000]
3Administrative costs are addressed in Breton and Scott [1978] and Panizza [2004]. Corruption and
local elites capture are extensively discussed by Bardhan and Mookherjee [2000, 2002, 2005, 2006].
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counterparts, in magnitudes that are growing over time. Low-developed autonomous mu-
nicipalities instead appear to be progressively losing terrain with respect to their non-
autonomous counterparts, even though effects are smaller and not always statistically sig-
nificant. Both test score gains and losses seem to be larger for students with a more
advantaged socioeconomic background: they gain more in highly developed cities but lose
more in low developed ones, increasing score dispersion in the former group of cities and
decreasing it in the latter.
In the second part of the analysis, exploring municipal balance sheet data, I show that high
and low developed municipalities implement different spending decisions. Autonomous
municipalities of the upper development quartile invest on local education not only the
ad-hoc transfers they receive from the government, but also add own financial resources to
their per-pupil education budget. Municipalities in the lowest development quartile only
spend the education resources they receive from the central government, or somewhat less.
The two groups also show significant differences in terms of municipal management and
law compliance indicators, in directions that are consistent with the results on student test
scores.
The three ways in which this paper adds to existing work in the field are its quasi-
experimental estimation setup, the ability to focus on solely administrative power shifts,
and the provision of suggestive evidence on channels that drive the heterogeneity in out-
comes across local development levels. Implications of the findings may represent relevant
references for future public service decentralization reforms to be implemented in low and
middle income contexts similar to the Colombian one, especially in presence of significant
subnational heterogeneity in development levels and local wealth.
2 Selected Literature
Heterogeneity in the effects of decentralization is modeled by Bardhan and Mookherjee
[2000, 2002, 2005, 2006], who show how the combination of strong local elites and weak
local institutions implies decentralization to yield under-provision of services to the local
poor. Channels for diversity of impacts across places and people are illustrated also in the
reviews by Kaiser [2006] and, with a special focus on developing countries, by Juetting et al.
[2005]. These reviews and the vast majority of empirical literature fail to establish any clear
link between decentralization and poverty reduction, and document higher advantages for
the rich with respect to the poor in decentralized contexts. Some studies describe corre-
lations between indicators of local welfare and the spending decisions of local politicians,
but do not establish causal relationships between the two. Reinikka and Svensson [2004]
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find that decentralized school grants in Uganda were subject to local elite capture, but less
so in better-off communities. Local governments are found to be more responsive to citi-
zen’s needs when the electorate is more informed and when better institutions are in place
in studies by Besley and Burgess [2002] on India and Ferraz and Finan [2011] on Brazil.
Faguet and Sanchez [2008, 2014] look at Colombian municipalities’ balance sheet data and
construct original aggregate measures of decentralization, then finding negative association
between dependence on central government transfers and expenditure on education, and
positive association with public school enrollment rates. There are studies that aim at iso-
lating causal effects of decentralization processes at different levels of local development, but
focusing on fiscal decentralization or at contexts in which administrative decentralization
came along with important fiscal and political changes. Hammond and Tosun [2011] apply
a spatial error model on the US and find that fiscal decentralization (as proxied by gov-
ernment fragmentation) led to gains in employment and economic growth for metropolitan
counties but insignificant to negative impacts for non-metropolitan ones. The fixed effects
analysis by Zhang [2006] shows that fiscal decentralization in China has promoted regional
inequality, mainly due to inequalities in tax bases and thus in fiscal burden, and in the
development of nonfarm activities between jurisdictions. Contrary to mainstream findings,
Faguet [2004] finds that after a large fiscal and political decentralization process the poor
and marginalized communities of Bolivia benefited and adapted their expenditure struc-
ture to local needs. Closest to this paper in terms of reform context analyzed and in terms
of outcomes looked at is Galiani et al. [2008], who show that transferring a number of
Argentinian schools from a central to a provincial management yielded positive results in
terms of test scores only for schools located in non-poor municipalities. This paper differs
from the study on Argentina in scale of the reform (transferring to local authorities some
additional schools versus the whole education service), in the level of government being
looked at (regional versus municipal), and in the availability of a quasi-experimental setup
for Colombia but not for Argentina4.
3 Decentralization in Colombia and the 2001 Reform
Starting in the 1980s, Colombia has been undergoing a progressive decentralization pro-
cess involving governance and administration, fiscal structure, and the delivery of public
services; various authors have looked at the outcomes of these gradual processes, some in a
4“The transfer schedule was determined through bilateral negotiations between the federal government
and each province” (Galiani et al., 2008, sec.3§3)
30
3.1 Pre-reform context and reform motivations 3 THE 2001 REFORM
qualitative and some in a quantitative fashion5. The reform in 2001 kept the political and
fiscal scenarios unchanged and enforced administrative decentralization6, reallocating local
authorities’ responsibilities towards the delivery of public services7.
3.1 Pre-reform context and reform motivations
Colombia is currently structured into local authorities as follows: there are thirty-two de-
partments8, 1,118 municipalities located within departments and four special districts (see
maps in Section A.1 in the Appendix). Local authorities enjoy decisional and spending
autonomy over a wide range of matters, although the necessary financial resources chiefly
consist of central government transfers deriving from national tax revenues9. Central gov-
ernment transfers have historically been accounting for around 90% of the total education
expenditure (nationwide average), and the remaining 10% is contributed by local author-
ities, with some local variability in these figures (Borjas and Acosta, 2000, p.6; Iregui B.
et al., 2006, p.31;Santa Maria S. et al., 2009, pp.19-20). Up to the 2001 reform, the law
had departments and municipalities jointly in charge of public education, entitled to hire
personnel and invest in infrastructure and equipment10; as a result the division of respon-
sibilities over the management of public education was vague and far from transparent
(Borjas and Acosta [2000]). De facto, being the direct recipients of the bulk of education
transfers11, departments were the primary players on the education sector12. The elimina-
5Keeping the focus on education outcomes, Borjas and Acosta [2000], Vergara and Simpson [2001] and
Caballero [2006] comprehensively illustrate dynamics and descriptive trends of decentralizing the public
education system over the nineties, agreeing on generally undistinguished results.
6Sometimes this type of administrative decentralization is labeled as ‘devolution’ in literature, referring
to situations in which the activities of subnational units of government are substantially outside the direct
control of the central government [Rondinelli et al., 1983].
7Educational outcomes of the 2001 reform are explored in the descriptive Colombian central bank report
by Lonzano et al. [2007], who conclude that the post-reform years have witnessed progress in attendance
rates but disappointing results in terms of quality and efficiency. Also Cortés [2010] focuses on the 2001
reform, uses enrollment data up to 2006 and compares municipalities who gained education autonomy to
the remaining, finding that the former significantly increased enrollments of publicly subsidized pupils into
private schools.
8These represent the regional level, equivalent to “states” in the US, or “provinces” in Argentina.
9Colombia is considered among the administratively most decentralized countries in Latin America,
but is fiscally very centralized (Alesina et al. [2000];Toro [2006]).
10Law 60 / 1993 (distributing competencies across levels of government and assigning resources accord-
ingly), Law 115 / 1994 (the ‘comprehensive education act’), and respective follow-up decrees.
11See Table 1
12For example, departmental payrolls included 85-90% of all public school teachers [Corte Constitucional,
1997, par.16], and departments decided on their allocation across municipalities. Municipalities were then
responsible for allocating teachers across schools within their territory, and hired the remaining 10-15%
that were not on departmental payrolls [Gómez et al., 2001]. Departments also had the final word on
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tion of any responsibility overlap for the sake of accountability was one of the main goals
of the 2001 reform; further goals were improving efficiency and reducing waste in the use
of public resources, eliminating the yearly fluctuations in financial transfers, and updating
some obsolete distribution criteria13.
3.2 Reform content
Regarding the management of public education, the enactment of Law 715/2001 yielded
the fundamental change of a clear-cut allocation of responsibility over the service to either
municipalities or departments. Municipalities which counted 100 thousand or more inhab-
itants in the year 2002 became “certified in education” (certified municipalities, from now
onwards), meaning responsible for the public education service on their territories. The
education transfers from the central government, which are assigned on a per-pupil base,
started to flow into their treasuries. Municipalities with fewer than 100 thousand inhabi-
tants were not certified, and their public education is run by the departments they belong
to. The next subsection further clarifies the concept of autonomy and discusses the shift
in responsibilities. The forty municipalities certified in 2001 account for around one third
of Colombia’s population and pupil share; their size ranges from 105 thousand to over 2
million inhabitants1415.
The 2001 reform affected not only the education service, but also the provision of health-
care, water and sewerage and other smaller public services. Nonetheless, it was only for
the education sector that this reform separated municipalities into autonomous and not,
and used the 100 thousand inhabitants rule. Another task performed by the 2001 reform
was updating the formulas used by the central government to compute financial transfers
financing local public services; section 3.2.1 below provides further details and discussion
on this aspect.
education proposals by municipalities, as these had to be taken in accordance with departments and under
their supervision (Law 60 / 1993). Also see the DDTS [2004] report, p.6.
13For the official document motivating the reform, see: "Exposición de motivos 715 de 2001 Nivel
Nacional", Congreso de Colombia, Gaceta del Congreso 294 de 2000. For further discussions of this matter
see among others Sarmiento and Vargas, 1997; Alesina et al. [2000]; Borjas and Acosta [2000]; Vergara and
Simpson [2001] and the technical report by DNP [2002].
14See their locations in panel c), Section A.1 Appendix.
15The reform provided for a transition period of two years (2002 and 2003), during which certified local
authorities took over the school infrastructure, started the effective management of the service, and had
the opportunity to reorganize staffing plans on their territories. During these two years temporary transfer
amounts were set, and from 2004 onwards the new transfer system became fully operational.
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3.2.1 Local authorities’ competencies and transfers before and after the reform
Table 1 summarizes competencies of local authorities before and after the 2001 reform, and
indicates percentages of education transfers flowing to their treasuries.
As illustrated in the table, the reform left the role of the central government unchanged
but polarized both financial transfers and managerial responsibilities of local authorities.
From receiving a narrow share of transfers and being subject to departmental supervi-
sion, certified municipalities transitioned into a situation of full managerial and financial
autonomy, while non-certified ones gave up their already limited powers to the respec-
tive departments16. For the rest of the analysis I will consider certified municipalities as
“treated” by the decentralization reform and the non-certified counterparts as “untreated”,
since both figures and anecdotal evidence indicate that a truly substantial change in regime
has happened for the former group but not for the latter. How a violation of this premise
would affect the interpretation of empirical results is discussed in Section 5.3.
The reform also brought an adjustment in the allocation formulas of education resources
to local authorities. In broad outlines, up to 2001 the vast majority of transfers were
assigned based on number and seniority of teachers employed, with some adjustment based
on number of inhabitants, local poverty and administrative efficiency. From 2002 onwards
the allocation criteria were tilted towards a student headcount base, but with number of
teachers still playing a key role, and again with some adjustment for local poverty and
population density; these changes applied to transfers to all local authorities, certified and
not17. Both before and after the reform, transfers are meant to be exclusively used for
the service to which they are dedicated, administered in separate accounts and thus not
fungible with respect to the remaining revenues and expenses of the local authority [MEN,
2003].
3.3 Further relevant aspects
3.3.1 Population and population cutoff
The population figures that were used for the 2001 reform were issued by the National
Statistics Office (DANE). The counts were not prepared ad hoc for the reform but issued on
16With only a 3% of total funds still flowing to non-certified municipalities, with pre-set destination.
These funds need to be spent entirely on school infrastructure and school material, according to depart-
ments’ directions [MEN, 2003 ; DDTS, 2004, p.7; Law 715/2001, art.16].
17The transition to a transfer system giving more weight to student head-counts should have, if anything,
favored municipalities characterized by low levels of local development„ as such areas have historically
been disadvantaged in terms of teacher provision [Corte Constitucional, 1997, par.19]. Evidence on central
government transfers having become more redistributive over time is presented in Table 15 in the Appendix.
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Table 1: Education responsibilities and transfers by level of government
Central Government
Curriculum, teacher wages, general guidelines, transfer to local authorities
Local Authorities
Up to 2002 (Law 60/1993) From 2002 onwards (Law 715/2001)
Certified Municipalities
Transfers:
84% to department
16% to
municipality
Transfers:
100% to
municipality
Teacher hiring,
training and
placement;
School infrastructure
and materials;
School transport and
any extra education
programs
Departments and
municipalities,
under departments’
supervision
Teacher hiring,
training and
placement;
School infrastructure
and materials;
School transport and
any extra education
programmes
Municipality only
Non-Certified Municipalities
Transfers:
97% to department
3% to municipality
Teacher hiring,
training and
placement;
School infrastructure
and materials;
School transport and
any extra education
programmes
Department only
(maintenance
duties for
municipality)
Author’s illustration, based on Laws 60/1993, 115/1994 and 715/2001 (República de Colombia); Borjas
and Acosta [2000]; DNP[2002]. Percentages are author’s derivation: pre-reform is based on 2001 data
in DNP[2002], p.16; post-reform is based on 2004 data in DNP[2004a] and DNP[2004b]. Percentages for
departments include the four special districts.
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the occasion of the 1993 general census, as forward projections. Certification was assigned
to those municipalities that according to the projections for the year 2002 were exceeding
100 thousand inhabitants. The cutoff was sharply implemented, and no exceptions were
made in either direction; the way population figures arose allows us to set aside any potential
suspicion of targeted count manipulation.
Beyond its use in the 2001 reform, the 100 thousand inhabitant cutoff does not play any
significant role in Colombia’s legislation and it is never used in other matters involving
municipal public service provision. The cutoff appears in the municipal classification that
is performed every fiscal year by the central government. Current inhabitant count and
current revenues are jointly used for the classification, and, given appropriate current rev-
enues, 100 thousand inhabitants may represent the lower bound for a ‘first’ category city18.
This categorization is updated every year and is used for setting limits to salaries of the
mayor, of council members and administrative staff and limits to general administrative
expenditures; the changes are minor across category thresholds. The smaller municipalities
(categories fourth to sixth) are entitled to special support transfers.
Figure 7 in the Appendix shows smoothness of various municipal characteristics around 100
thousand inhabitants. Most notably, student test scores just before the reform (in 2001) do
not exhibit discontinuities at the 2002 treatment cutoff. If we believe test scores to reflect a
range of underlying municipal characteristics, especially those affecting education outcomes,
the lack of discontinuities in pre-reform scores injects further confidence on the absence of
any relevant transitions occurring at 100 thousand inhabitants. Further falsification and
robustness tests on these aspects are performed along the empirical analysis.
3.3.2 Districts and special municipalities
Districts are local authorities whose nature is mixed between departments and municipali-
ties. Already before 2002, districts were drawing the totality of their financial entitlements
for education directly into their treasuries and managing them autonomously. The four
Colombian districts are Bogotá, Barranquilla, Cartagena and Santa Marta, and they are
excluded from the analysis.
There are two municipalities19 whose freedoms on local education policy had been formally
enhanced in 1999-2000, even though the substantial implications of the procedure remained
18Law 136 / 1994 and Law 617 / 2000. The seven categories and their relative inhabitant cutoffs are:
Special (500,001 or above), First (100,001 to 500,000), Second (50,001 to 100,000), Third (30,001 to 50,000),
Fourth (20,001 to 30,000), Fifth (10,001 to 20,000) and Sixth (10,000 or below).
19The municipalities of Armenia (department of Quindio) and San Juan de Pasto (department of Nariño).
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unclear. I exclude these two cities from the analysis.
4 Data
4.1 Test scores
Colombia has a long running tradition of standardized testing in public schools; ICFES is
the government agency in charge of conducting and assessing the tests across the whole
country. The most complete and frequent test score data refers to the Saber11 examination,
which is administered to all students completing high school20, and which is widely accepted
as the reference examination to evaluate the quality of Colombian secondary education.
Saber11 evaluates a range of school subjects; test scores range from 0 to 100 in each
subject and are standardized by subject at the national level, to a mean of 50 and a
standard deviation of 10. This is, each student’s score is informative about his/her position
relative to the national average in that subject. Individual-level Saber11 test scores are
made available by ICFES for the years 2000 to 2012, with information about the school
and municipality to which each student belongs, and some information student background.
4.2 Municipal Development Measures
The development level of Colombian municipalities is being evaluated periodically by gov-
ernment agencies: relevant data is collected by the National Statistics Office (DANE) and
the summative indicators are calculated by the National Planning Department (DNP). Up
to the year 2013, the most informative and widely used indicator on local development
was the Municipal Development Index (hereafter MDI21). The MDI ranges from 0 to 100
and expresses a composite measure of municipal development; it considers ‘social’ or ‘life
quality’ variables such as coverage of energy, water and sewerage systems, literacy rates and
poverty ratios, and ‘financial status’ variables such as per capita tax revenue and public
spending, and dependency on central government transfers; the higher index value, the
better local development. I use the 2001 MDI index to measure the local development of
municipalities at the time of the reform. As can be seen in Figures 1, 5 and 6, size and
20This is, students completing 11 years of schooling. The first 9 years are compulsory, the last 2 are
optional.
21Translation from the original Índice de Desarrollo Municipal (IDM). Data on the index is provided for
public use by the Colombian National Planning Department (DNP - Departamento Nacional de Planeación).
A new “Overall Performance Index” (Índice de Desempeño Integral (IDI)) has been issued starting in 2006
and has now replaced the IDM (2013 onwards).
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local development level are overall positively correlated but with high variation at all size
ranges. Municipalities which obtained certification in 2002 had MDI values ranging from
28 to 70; the empirical analysis will use the distribution of development of certified cities
to determine development quartiles.
5 Empirical framework
The aim is to identify the impact of municipal autonomy over the management of local
education on student test scores, especially looking out for heterogeneous patterns that the
effect might display across different levels of local development. The next subsections first
introduce and then discuss the two identification strategies adopted.
5.1 Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design
The fact that in 2001 certification was assigned solely on the basis of the 100 thousand
municipal population cutoff sets the conditions for a sharp regression discontinuity (RD)
design. The subsequent methodological summary draws on the excellent outlines by Imbens
and Lemieux [2008] and Pettersson-Lidbom [2008], to which I refer for a more detailed
discussion of the RD methodology. Consider the equation (I) Yi = α+ τ Ci + i , where
Yi represents average test scores in municipality i and Ci is a dummy signaling whether
municipality i was certified in education (Ci = 1) or not (Ci = 0). The consistent estimation
of the treatment effect τ is hindered by the fact that most likely certification Ci is correlated
with other municipal characteristics enclosed in i. In our setup though, we know that the
sole assignment rule for Ci was population count Pi, and specifically whether Pi exceeded
c = 100 000 or not, such that Ci = 1 {Pi > c} where 1 {.} is the indicator function. In this
case we have that conditioning on population Pi will remove any correlation between Ci
and i, so that treatment Ci is as good as randomly assigned conditional on Pi22. Thus the
ideal specification of a ‘control function’ h (Pi) is such that its insertion into our equation
(I) will completely purge it from any dependence between Ci and i [Heckman and Robb,
1985]. In practice it is difficult to guess the ideal functional form of h (Pi) and thus a
common approach is to use flexible functions such as high order polynomials of Pi23. In
22Other ways to express this is saying that the ‘conditional mean independence’ or ‘selection on observ-
ables’ or ‘unconfoundedness’ assumption holds, E [i|Ci, Pi] = E [i|Pi].
23This is sometimes referred to as ‘global polynomial series’ estimator. Other estimators of the treatment
effect in a RD setting are kernel estimators, and estimators based on trimming data close to the boundary
such as local linear regression or other nonparametric methods. In a recent working paper, Gelman and
Imbens [2014] recommend to prefer the latter group to the global polynomial method I employ here. These
methods are data thirsty and require high numbers of observations close to the boundary, a luxury that is
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order to ensure that τ is capturing only the effect of the treatment, we also need all other
characteristics of the observed units not to change discontinuously at the treatment cutoff.
In our case, we need municipal characteristics other than certification in education not to
exhibit ‘jumps’ at 100 thousand inhabitants, otherwise we would not know which part of
the estimated effect on test scores is due to certification and which part is due to the other
changes happening at 100 thousand inhabitants. Smoothness of municipal characteristics
was discussed in section 3.3.1, and further evidence on pre-reform smoothness of test scores
is given through the falsification tests in section A.4.
I estimate the model
Yi = α+ τRD Ci + f(Pi) + i (1)
where f (Pi) is approximated by a third oder polynomial in Pi, and interpret τRD as
the average treatment effect of certification in education. I then introduce the municipal
development variable Di, expressing the MDI indicator illustrated in section 4.2. Hetero-
geneity across levels of local development can be explored either by applying 1 to different
subsamples, or by introducing an interaction term between certification and development,
obtaining
Yi = α+ τ
RD
0 Ci + τ
RD
1 Ci ·Di + βDi + f(Pi) + i (2)
where τRD0 + τRD1 Di can be interpreted as the average treatment effect of certification at
development level Di. Section 6 shows the estimation results of 1 on the full sample of
municipalities and on four subsamples split by development of certified cities (upper half
and lower half, highest quartile and lowest quartile), and the estimation results of 2.
Regression discontinuity designs are notably data demanding and rarely free of obstacles
(more on this in the discussion section 5.3). The fact that only forty cities obtained cer-
tification in 2002 and that their population sizes are not all clustered at 100 thousand
inhabitants poses difficulties in terms of available sample size and precision. I am able to
reduce sampling variance by using ten post-reform years of data (2002-2012); including year
fixed effects is not necessary in this setup as the test score outcomes are standardized each
year according to the yearly national performance. Further discussion of the RD estimation
is available in Section 5.3.
unavailable in this setting.
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5.2 Fixed Effect Regression on a Discontinuity Sample
An alternative method for estimating the average treatment treatment effect of certification
in education on student test scores is applying the fixed effects (FE) concept, which exploits
over-time variation in the performance of municipalities that acquire certification. The basic
FE model reads as follows:
Yit = α+ τ
FECit +Mi +Tt + it (3)
where test scores in municipality i and year t, Yit, are regressed on certification status Cit,
which takes value 1 in years from 2002 onwards for municipalities who obtained certification,
and is 0 otherwise. Municipality fixed effects areMi and time fixed effects are Tt; the effect
of certification is captured by τFE .
I limit the sample to municipalities with a number of inhabitants close to the certification
cutoff, both from the left and from the right, in order to avoid confounders such as municipal
characteristics varying with population size to threaten identification. Following Angrist
and Lavy [1999], I refer to this as our ‘discontinuity sample’. We are thus estimating 3 on a
sample of cities that are similar to each other in size, out of which some acquired education
autonomy (C = 1) in 2002 and some did not.
For the main specification in the empirical analysis I use municipalities between 80 thousand
and 130 thousand inhabitants - which results in a sample of thirty cities, eleven of which
acquired certification in 2002 and nineteen did not24, and whose population counts and
development indices are illustrated in Figure 1 with dark bars and light bars respectively25.
Table 2 shows some relevant summary statistics separately for certified and non-certified
municipalities, and highlights the similarity of the two groups in terms of pre-reform char-
acteristics - including pre-reform test score levels. The thirty cities in the discontinuity
sample account for about 8.35% of the student population enrolled in primary and sec-
ondary school in 201226.
In order to pursue our goal of identifying heterogeneity in the effects of autonomy by levels
of local development, model 3 is augmented with an interaction term between certification
status Cit and development measure Di, obtaining
24Results are robust to extending or restricting the sample; regressions on different samples, including
the same sample used for the RD estimation, are presented in Table in the Appendix.
25Figure 6 in the Appendix shows the two distributions for a wider range of municipalities.
26Author’s calculation, based on enrollment data provided by MEN (Ministry of Education).
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Figure 1: Population and MDI distribution of the 30 municipalities around the inhabitant
cutoff
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Yit = α+ τ
FE
0 Cit + τ
FE
1 Cit ·Di + γMi + δTt + it (4)
where the effect of certification at development level Di will be given by the estimates of
τFE0 + τ
FE
1 Di. Section 6 shows results of this fixed effects approach.
5.3 Discussion of identification
As anticipated in section 5.1, the probably most salient difficulty of applying the RD
methodology to the context of this paper is the limited sample size available, which exposes
the analysis to both low power and potentially excessive small sample variation. In fact the
confidence levels at which the null is being rejected in the result section are not particularly
impressive27. Moreover, also cities distant from the treatment cutoff are used for estimation
27The limited amount of available data points also prescribes parsimony in the number of model pa-
rameters to estimate. The parsimonious regression model 1 is therefore chosen for the main specification
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Table 2: Municipalities in the discontinuity sample (80,000 - 130,000 inhabitants)
Certified (11) Non certified (19) Difference
Population in 1992 99,998 73,182 26,816 ***(1,820)
Population in 2002 120,670 91,043 29,627 ***(692)
Population in 2012 127,756 112,305 15,451 ***(3,705)
Municipal Development
Index (MDI) 2001
40.99 40.59 0.40 (1.92)
Unsatisfied Basic Needs
indicator (UBN) 1993
45.18 45.34 -0.16 (0.96)
Saber 11 Math score 2001 40.38 40.45 -0.07 (0.39)
Saber 11 Language score
2001
45.27 45.33 -0.06 (0.62)
Public primary school
gross enrollment rates 2001
0.67 0.67 -0.00 (0.06)
Public secondary school
gross enrollment rates 2001
0.61 0.61 0.00 (0.05)
Standard error of mean difference in parentheses; *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
of the RD model28, which relies on the assumption that the population polynomial f (Pi)
is able to ‘control’ for those municipal characteristics that vary with size and may confound
the effect of autonomy on test scores. The less one needs to move away from the cutoff
(the larger the sample close to the cutoff), the more likely it is that such confounders are
properly eliminated. Despite these drawbacks, results display a fairly stable path across
subsamples and are robust to different specifications (see section A.9.1).
As anticipated in Section 3.2.1, one may hold that the 2001 reform implied not only an
increase in autonomy for the cities which obtained certification, but also some loss of
autonomy for the cities which did not, leading to a certain extent of ‘inverse treatment’ in
the control group29. In the case the reform had induced changes in the education trends
of ‘untreated’ municipalities too, both the regression discontinuity and the fixed effects
instead of the RD approach that leaves two different sets of parameters on the two sides of the treatment
cutoff (see Imbens and Lemieux [2008] for a discussion). Table 17 in the Appendix shows result of the latter
method too.
28All cities between 10 and 500 thousand inhabitants.
29For the reasons and context explained in Sections 3.2 and 3.2.1, the author’s assessment is that this
scenario ought not to be excessively worried about.
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analysis would be affected through alterations in their control groups. One would then need
reject the interpretation of estimated results as the effects of an ‘increase in autonomy’ (or
effects of decentralization), and rather look at results as the effects of ‘an autonomy gap’
(or effects of authority polarization). These interpretational issues are however confined to
the background as one keeps in mind the primary objective of capturing heterogeneity in
the effect of autonomy across different levels of the local development spectrum.
6 Results
6.1 Regression Discontinuity results
6.1.1 Baseline results
Table 3 shows estimation results for the regression discontinuity models (1) and (2), on
Mathematics and Spanish student test scores on the 2002-2012 period. In all cases I have
excluded from the analysis municipalities of special sizes, namely those below 10 thousand
and above 500 thousand inhabitants (municipal categories “Special” and “Sixth” - see foot-
note 18). Column (1) of each panels report the outcome of model (1). The estimate of the
average effect of certification in education on municipal test scores is close to zero. Columns
(2) to (5) of each panel explore heterogeneities in the effect, considering different subsam-
ples of the 2001 MDI distribution of certified cities: model (1) is applied to the lower and
upper 50% development range and to the bottom and top 25% of the range. As anticipated
in Section 4.2, development quartiles are constructed referring to the distribution of local
development of certified cities. Figure 5 in the Appendix illustrates how in correspondence
of lower levels of this distribution we find a larger number of smaller, non-certified cities. A
larger ‘control group’ at low levels of development is what causes low-development sample
sizes to be larger than the high-development ones throughout the analysis.
Looking at the result pattern, a test score gap appears to be opening between the most and
the least developed autonomous cities. More precisely, high developed cities who become
autonomous do better and low-developed cities do worse than their non-certified counter-
parts30. The effect on the high developed group is larger and more precisely estimated.
Table 12 in the Appendix shows that in the pre-reform period (years 2000 and 2001 data)
this pattern is not visible, and neither there is any evidence for differential score growth
30Keeping in mind that test scores are nationally standardized, the post-reform bifurcation could arise
because certified municipalities change their performance and non-certified ones remain static, or the other
way round, or a mix of both effects. Refer to the discussion in Section 5.3.
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in the different development subsamples. In Section A.6 in the Appendix I perform formal
tests on the difference between pre-reform and post-reform RD coefficients.
The magnitudes of the effects are sizable: negative 1.5 points (0.15 student standard devi-
ations) for certified cities in the least developed quartile and positive 2 points (0.2 student
standard deviations) for certified cities in the most developed quartile. The three panels in
the first column of Figure 2 depicts these estimation results graphically.
Columns (6) in Table 3 show the estimation of model (2), where certification status is
linearly interacted with the development percentile to which each municipality belongs, as
an alternative way to capture heterogeneity in the effect. This second estimation approach
confirms the pattern previously emerged: the effect of certification is increasing in MDI
values, starting negative for low MDI values and becoming positive at higher ones.
6.1.2 Consolidation over time
After looking at the average effect on scores over the whole post-reform period 2002-2012,
I will now concentrate on years further away from the reform date. Cohorts of high school
students taking the Saber 11 exam in later years have been exposed to the reform for
longer31; moreover one should allow for certified municipalities to gradually implement their
medium and long-horizon education plans. Table 4 shows how the estimated effect on test
scores grows in absolute values as model (1) is run on periods further and further away from
the reform date (time periods starting in 2004, 2007 and 2010). Figure 3 uses point estimates
and confidence intervals from Table 4 to illustrate how certified cities in the top 25%
development range progressively increase their score gap with respect to their non-certified
counterparts, while the opposite happens for cities in the bottom 25% development range.
Looking at the last period (2010-2012), the point estimates have reached about a third of
a student standard deviation into both directions. In Section A.5 of the Appendix I show
analogous over-time changes in the effect estimations obtained using mutually exclusive
year bins instead of progressively later time periods.
31In the spirit of the exercise performed by Galiani et al. [2008] in their paper on Argentinian school
decentralization.
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Table 3: Effect of certification on Saber11 test scores - Main RD estimation
(a) Mathematics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Bot. 25% Bot. 50% Top 50% Top 25% Interact.
Certified 0.17 -1.58 0.40 0.73 2.20∗∗ -2.37∗∗∗
(0.63) (0.99) (0.94) (0.87) (0.86) (0.84)
Certif.*MDI‘01 0.06∗∗∗
(0.02)
MDI ‘01 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,572 6,536 7,100 472 275 7,561
R-sq. 0.013 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.050 0.084
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
(b) Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Bot. 25% Bot. 50% Top 50% Top 25% Interact.
Certified 0.07 -1.55 0.32 0.52 1.81 -2.11∗∗
(0.66) (1.00) (0.94) (0.90) (1.14) (0.96)
Certif.*MDI‘01 0.05∗∗
(0.02)
MDI ‘01 0.09∗∗∗
(0.01)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,572 6,536 7,100 472 275 7,561
R-sq. 0.018 0.003 0.004 0.011 0.035 0.123
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
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Table 4: Certification on Saber 11 test scores - progress over time
[ Regression Discontinuity Estimation ]
(a) Top 25% MDI ‘01
Mathematics Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 2004 Post 2007 Post 2010 Post 2004 Post 2007 Post 2010
Certified 2.37∗∗ 3.00∗∗∗ 3.80∗∗ 1.64 1.36 1.92
(0.92) (1.06) (1.52) (1.09) (1.04) (1.29)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 225 150 75 225 150 75
R-sq. 0.069 0.137 0.199 0.038 0.126 0.137
(b) Bottom 25% MDI ‘01
Mathematics Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 2004 Post 2007 Post 2010 Post 2004 Post 2007 Post 2010
Certified -1.80 -2.23∗ -3.17∗∗ -1.47 -1.61 -2.03∗
(1.12) (1.29) (1.60) (1.02) (1.06) (1.12)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,344 3,609 1,809 5,344 3,609 1,809
R-sq. 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.007
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
6.2 Fixed effects regression results
The results of the fixed effects identification strategy described in Section 5.2 are shown
in Table 5, for both the basic model (3) and the specification that allows for effect het-
erogeneity in development (4). The sample is composed of the 30 municipalities closest
to the inhabitant cutoff: 19 non-certified ones with more than 80 thousand inhabitants
and 11 certified ones with less than 130 thousand inhabitants. The outcome variables are
municipal test score averages in years 2000 to 2012. The first two columns of each panel
refer to the basic model, showing OLS and municipality fixed effects estimations. The third
and fourth column show OLS and fixed effects estimations of the main specification, using
the MDI 2001 as a proxy for municipal development. The average effect of certification is
estimated through the basic model as close to zero and statistically not significant. The
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Figure 3: Effect of certification over time
[ Regression Discontinuity Estimation ]
RD estimations of the effect of certification on average Math test scores, for certified municipalities in the
top 25% and the bottom 25% development range (triangles and circles series respectively). Capped spikes
indicate 95% confidence intervals on point estimates.
model allowing for heterogeneity across development levels unveils the same pattern that
was detected through the regression discontinuity identification: the point-estimated effect
of autonomy goes from being between one and two points negative at low levels of develop-
ment, crosses the zero threshold at a MDI level of around 45 and grows to reach a positive
value of around two points at MDI levels of 70, as illustrated graphically in Figure 4. These
magnitudes are very similar to the ones estimated with the RD technique for the lowest
and highest development quartile32.
32Even though they preserve the qualitative pattern, results for Language are again less imposing, as in
the RD strategy.
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Table 5: Effect of certification on Saber 11 test scores - Main FE estimation
Mathematics Spanish language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Certified 0.06 0.02 -3.02∗ -3.67∗∗∗ -0.05 -0.01 -1.93 -0.92
(0.76) (0.53) (1.64) (1.26) (0.80) (0.26) (1.64) (0.55)
Certif*MDI‘01 0.07∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.04 0.02∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
MDI ‘01 0.09∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 389 389 389 389 389 389 389 389
N groups 30 30 30 30
R-sq. 0.39 0.67 0.58 0.68 0.38 0.77 0.63 0.77
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses; * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
Figure 4: Effects of certification at different development levels (FE estimation)
48
6.3 Discussion of main results 6 RESULTS
6.3 Discussion of main results
Two different strategies have been employed to isolate the effect of local autonomy in the
education service on quality of education, as measured by student test scores, at different
levels of municipal development. Both techniques yielded the conclusion that cities at the
upper end of the development range benefitted from the acquired autonomy while those at
the lower end did not, and rather took loss on it, giving rise to a test score gap between
the two groups that appears to be widening over time.
This section concludes with the reflection that the two identification strategies adopted
rely on different assumptions but are shown to yield effect estimations which are qualita-
tively alike and quantitatively very similar, which represents a rewarding result on its own.
Moreover, the regression discontinuity design estimates the effect of autonomy for city sizes
around 100 thousand, while the fixe d effects methodology estimates the average effect of
higher autonomy across all certified cities included in the sample33. By comparing the two
sets of results, we thus learn that the effect magnitudes seem to be fairly stable across city
sizes ranging from around 100 thousand to around 500 thousand inhabitants34.
In the remaining sections of the paper the focus will lie upon cities in the highest and
lowest quartiles of the certified development range, as these are the two groups on which
significant reform effects have been identified. The goal will be exploring these effects in
further detail and providing explanations for the test score dynamics found.
6.4 Compositional effects, migration and public-private education
This section addresses the question of whether the over-time changes in test scores purely
reflect changes in student performance (an ‘intensive margin’ result), or whether the pool
of test takers has also been changing as a result of the reform (‘compositional effect’ or
‘extensive margin’). The pool of test takers may change if we observed responses to the
reform such as selective migration (into or away from the newly autonomous municipalities),
switching of students between public and private schools, or changes in student school
dropout patterns. Tables 6 and 7 show regression discontinuity and fixed effects estimations
respectively, of test taker characteristics on the municipal autonomy indicator (certification
status). Characteristics being looked at are number of test takers, share of female students,
share of students whose mother is low educated or high educated, and the share of students
33In the main results, cities between 80 and 130 thousand inhabitants; in the robustness checks, cities
between 50 and 250 thousand and between 10 and 500 thousand inhabitants.
34Considering also the exercises of variation of the sample range that are performed in the robustness
checks (Table 19).
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who work while studying. In the RD results, the only statistically significant pattern we
are able to spot is an apparent shift of high-educated families away from low-developed
municipalities and into high-developed ones, which might suggest some degree of selective
migration of the better educated families. Looking at the FE specifications though, at
development ranges which are relevant to certified municipalities (MDI = 29 to 70 approx.),
the magnitudes of these shifts are estimated close to zero. Patterns on low-educated mothers
are never statistically significant and the share of working students does not exhibit changes.
Overall it seems prudent to conclude that with the available data I am not able to pin down
any clear and robust compositional effects on Saber 11 test candidates, as a consequence
of the decentralization reform.
Table 6: Municipal certification and test taker characteristics (RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N. takers Female Low ME High ME Work
a) All –127.91 –0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01
(99.84) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
b) Bottom 25% –262.10 –0.00 0.10 –0.04** 0.01
(163.87) (0.00) 0.06 (0.03) (0.03)
c) Top 25% 81.04 0.01 –0.04 0.10** 0.03
(460.65) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
d) All, interact. 185.83 0.02 0.03 –0.05* 0.06
(185.86) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04)
Certif*MDI‘01 –6.71 –0.00 0.00 0.00* –0.00
(4.79) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mean Y (All) 321 0.54 0.60 0.06 0.12
N [n. municip.] a) 7,523 [698] 7,523 [698] 4,821 [697] 4,821 [697] 4,829 [698]
b) 6,488 [603] 6,488 [603] 4,158 [602] 4,158 [602] 4,166 [603]
c) 275 [25] 275 [25] 175 [25] 175 [25] 175 [25]
d) 7,512 [697] 7,512 [697] 4,814 [696] 4,814 [696] 4,821 [697]
RD regressions of different outcome variables (in columns) on certification status and a
third degree population polynomial. Cells show coefficient and standard errors on the
certification regressor. The rows refer respectively to: a) All municipalities; b) munici-
palities in the bottom 25% devlopment range; c) municipalities in the top 25% develop-
ment range; d) All municipalities, with main effect and development interaction term.
SEs clustered by municipalities in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The mean of certified municipalities is 1, 947 test takers.
The absence of significant compositional changes in the pool of test candidates is in line
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Table 7: Municipal certification and test taker characteristics (FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N. takers Female Low ME High ME Work
a) All 31.50 –0.00 –0.02 0.00 0.00
(68.72) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
b) All, interact. 128.70 –0.00 –0.04 –0.03* –0.09
(270.37) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
Certif*MDI‘01 –2.15 –0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00
(5.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mean Y 971 0.55 0.49 0.08 0.11
N [n. municip.] a) 389 [30] 389 [30] 270 [30] 270 [30] 270 [30]
b) 389 [30] 389 [30] 270 [30] 270 [30] 270 [30]
Municipal FE regressions of different outcome variables (in columns) on certification status. Cells
show coefficient and standard errors on the certification regressor. The rows refer respectively
to: a) All municipalities; b) All municipalities, with main effect and development interaction
term. SEs clustered by municipalities in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
with what one would expect after considering two basic facts about Colombia’s school pop-
ulation35. The first is the significant and persistent gap between the quality of private
and public education. Private schools score substantially and consistently better on stan-
dardized tests such as the national ICFES or international PISA results (Cerquera et al.
[2000]; Barrera-Osorio et al., 2012; Gamboa and Waltenberg, 2011), have smaller class
sizes36 and are four times more likely to offer full-day school programs with respect to pub-
lic schools, which instead see double the frequency of morning-only or late hours programs
([Bonilla Mejía, 2011]. In sum, it is fair to say that private education in Colombia, as
well as in the rest of Latin America, is still a privilege restricted to well-off families (also
see Gamboa and Waltenberg [2011]for a discussion). The implementation of a reform that
shifts responsibility over public schools from the regional to the municipality level would
not be expected to close the gap between public and private education, or to make public
institutions significantly more attractive to well-off families. The second fact to keep in
mind relates to the first: the family of the typical public-school student in Colombia is less
likely to be informed about a decentralization reform occurring, to form strong predictions
about its effects on educational quality, or to have the means and opportunity to migrate
35In addition to the fact that the publicity of this regime change on mass media has been very limited.
36Approximately 35 students per teacher in public schools and 25 students per teacher in private schools
(averaged over the period 1998-2008). Author’s own calculations using national statistics office education
data (DANE C-600).
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to a different municipality.
6.5 Heterogeneity across people
Along with the heterogeneity in effects across municipalities, heterogeneity across people
within municipalities is a dimension that ought to be looked at. In this section I look
at how autonomy has impacted the dispersion of test scores in cities of the high and
low developed group. Moreover, I am interested in investigating whether students from
different socioeconomic backgrounds have been differently affected by local autonomy on
public education.
Using the self-reported background information on Saber11 test takers, I divide students
by social status as proxied by their mother’s education (ME): low mother education for
compulsory education (9 school years) or less, high mother education is education beyond
compulsory. Information on mother education is available for all years excluding 2005, 2006
and 200737. Table 8 shows estimates obtained applying our main regression discontinuity
model (1) on test score standard deviations (SD), and then on test scores of students
belonging to the two social background categories.
The picture that emerges from these results is that students with higher social background
seem to be more susceptible to changes in local autonomy: they gain more in high-developed
cities and they lose more in low-developed ones, with respect to lower social background
students.
7 Channels
7.1 Expenditure on education
In the pursuit of the reasons behind heterogeneous educational outcomes between high-
developed and low-developed autonomous cities, the perhaps most straightforward starting
point is expenditure choices. Using detailed balance sheet data38 of municipalities in the
highest and lowest development quartiles, in Table 9 I perform t-tests on the mean ex-
penditures of the two groups over the post-reform period 2002-2012. Central government
transfers that municipalities receive to finance education services (SGP Educación) are also
37Reason for the smaller sample sizes on the mother education (ME) specifications, with respect to the
standard deviation (SD) specifications.
38“Ejecuciones municipales, formato largo”. Reported yearly by municipalities to the government agency
DNP (Departamento Nacional de Planeación). Source: Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá, 2015.
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Table 8: Effect of local autonomy on score dispersion and by social background
(a) Mathematics
Bottom 25% cities Top 25% cities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
score SD Low ME High ME score SD Low ME High ME
Certified -0.45∗ -1.56 -3.05∗ 0.43∗ 2.28∗∗ 2.76∗∗∗
(0.24) (1.26) (1.80) (0.23) (0.97) (0.91)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6,524 4,128 3,932 275 175 175
R-sq. 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.046 0.029
(b) Spanish Language
Bottom 25% cities Top 25% cities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
score SD Low ME High ME score SD Low ME High ME
Certified -0.13 -1.34 -2.85∗∗ 0.02 1.47 1.66∗
(0.15) (1.06) (1.40) (0.23) (1.19) (0.88)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6,524 4,128 3,932 275 175 175
R-sq. 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.033 0.035
compared, as well as the resulting difference between spending and transfers. Recall that
spending on education exceeding government transfers is covered by municipalities using
their own resources, which are represented mainly by local tax and fees collection, and by
capital gains39.
What emerges from the comparisons performed in Table 9 is that the average per-pupil
expenditure by municipalities in the highest development quartile is almost 23% higher than
the one of municipalities in the lowest development quartile. Within education expenditure,
the difference on personnel salaries is around 13%, up to 30% on school infrastructure and
material and as much as 63% higher on other education expenses and programs40. The
39Examples of local tax and fees are the housing and land ownership tax, tax on gasoline consumption,
traffic fines. Examples of capital gains are interests on municipal accounts and rents from municipal-owned
infrastructure and land.
40Examples of the most frequent balance sheet items in this category are school transport, teacher for-
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asymmetry in spending is not matched by any asymmetry in central government resources
received. In fact, while the low-developed group appears to be spending on education
barely as much as it receives in education transfers, the high-developed group is integrating
transfers with own resources, for around 12% of their total education spending41. The
differences in spending behavior uncovered through analysis of municipal balance data
provides at least suggestive evidence towards the explanation of student test score dynamics
previously identified.
Table 9: Per-pupil expenditure and transfers received
All certified Low 25% High 25% ∆ H - L ∆%
A) Education spending 1160.58 1021.83 1282.54 260.71*** 22.66%
(402.76) (406.27) (438.28) (81.28)
- Salaries 930.44 836.58 954.25 117.67** 13.14%
(302.62) (319.52) (280.06) (58.12)
- Infrastr. and material 98.46 103.95 140.94 37.00* 30.21%
(90.20) (93.11) (132.88) (21.90)
- Others 82.65 52.65 100.82 48.17*** 62.77%
(93.85) (73.70) (97.78) (16.56)
B) Education transfers 1153.41 1114.91 1134.53 19.61 1.74%
(415.96) (383.34) (319.94) (57.13)
A) - B) 7.17 –93.08 148.01**
(34.23) (66.73) (54.26)
N.obs (expenditure) 240 56 50 106
N.obs (transfers) 345 88 70 158
N. municipalities 35 9 7 16
Table of mean annual per-pupil expenditures and central government transfers received
(2002-2012, in thousands of Colombian pesos) and t-tests on the mean differences.
Standard deviations in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
mation, planning and development of school information systems, investments in efficiency of the municipal
education management authority, contracts with private institutions for additional education services.
41Table 15 in the Appendix shows that municipalities in the higher developed group have been enjoying
higher availability of own resources both before and after the reform. The resource gap between the two
groups has been significantly narrowed in post-reform years, mainly through compensatory transfers from
the central government.
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7.2 Administration indicators
Table 10 summarizes data on municipal evaluation processes that are carried out by the
government on a yearly basis42. The ‘Legal compliance rate’ (Índice de Cumplimiento de
Requisitos Legales) indicates the extent to which the municipality administration is found
to adhere to the national norms in its use of government transfers, in all sectors of activity.
The frequency of detection of accounting irregularities and illicit use of funds determine the
rating received through this index [DNP, 2014]. The ‘Managerial capabilities index’ (Índice
de Capacidad Administrativa) measures the extent to which the municipal administration
appears suitable and prepared to perform its tasks thoroughly and to promote local devel-
opment. The elements factoring into the index are the stability of managerial employees,
the level of competency of clerks, the availability of suitable IT equipment and the level of
automation of administrative processes [DNP, 2011]. The takeaway from Table 10 is that
there are significant differences in these administration quality indicators between high-
developed and low-developed municipalities, in the direction one would expect. This holds
true for both municipalities that were certified (panel a) ) and for smaller municipalities
(panel b) ). Adding to the evidence on expenditure behavior, the striking differences in
these quality indicators provide further suggestive evidence towards the channels through
which test score dynamics may have come about. Municipalities in the high-development
range, characterized by higher availability of financial resources and a more pro-education
spending policy, along with higher quality administration capabilities, were able to improve
education quality on their territories with respect to the centralized management. The op-
posite has been true for cities in the low-development range, with fewer local resources and
worse management skills.
7.3 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of test score differences
Having documented the existence of significant differences in education expenditure and
administration indices between highly developed and low developed municipalities, it is
desirable to gauge the extent to which such differences are able to explain the gap in
student performance between the two groups of cities. Table 11 shows the results of the
decomposition technique proposed by Oaxaca [1973] and Blinder [1973], which splits test
score gaps into explained and unexplained components43. The results show that around
42DNP-DDTS (Departamento Nacional de Planeación - Dirección de Desarrollo Territorial Sostenible)
is the government agency in charge of the study.
43This is sometimes known as the ‘twofold’ decomposition approach. See the excellent illustration by
Jann [2008] for reference. The baseline coefficient vector is obtained by regressing student test scores on
per-pupil expenditure, the two administration quality indices and the third-degree population polynomial
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Table 10: Municipal administration indices
a) Certified municipalities All certified Low 25% High 25% ∆ H - L
Managerial capabilities 67.99 46.01 79.12 33.11***
(25.08) (26.84) (16.77) (4.38)
Compliance rate 77.87 69.74 79.18 9.43*
(22.95) (29.45) (21.50) (5.01)
N.obs 245 63 49 112
N. municipalities 9 7 16
b) All municipalities All Low 25% High 25% ∆ H - L
Managerial capabilities 63.67 61.98 80.39 18.41***
(25.25) (25.56) (17.39) (1.99)
Compliance rate 74.65 73.73 83.35 9.6***
(22.23) (22.66) (16.52) (1.77)
N.obs 4841 4187 168 4355
N. municipalities
Table of evaluation indices (mean 2005-2012, scales 1-100) and t-tests on the mean dif-
ferences. Standard deviations in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
one third of the gap is attributable to raw differences in expenditure and administration
quality, with the latter playing the by far larger role. According to this decomposition, if
highly developed cities recorded the same per-pupil education expenditure and the same
administration quality indices as we find among low developed cities, their average test
score performances would have been one point (or 10% of a student standard deviation)
lower.
Differences in expenditure quantities and administration indices do not directly account for
the remaining two thirds of the test score gap: it is returns to expenditure and especially
to administration capacity that appear to differ significantly between highly- and low de-
veloped cities. These differences in returns are likely to capture differences between the two
groups of cities which are not currently being accounted for.
on the sample of all certified cities. Baseline coefficients are then used to analyze the score differential
betwen cities in the highest and the lowest development quartile. The differential is decomposed into a part
that is explained by group differences in predictors (“Explained” component, or “quantity effect”), and a
part that is attributed to different returns to predictors across the two groups (“Unexplained” component).
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Table 11: Oaxaca decomposition of test score differences
Mathematics Spanish Language
2005 2007 2010 2005 2007 2010
Differential
Prediction LD 42.067∗∗∗ 41.959∗∗∗ 41.665∗∗∗ 43.484∗∗∗ 43.659∗∗∗ 43.057∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.46) (0.64) (0.37) (0.36) (0.45)
Prediction HD 45.600∗∗∗ 45.813∗∗∗ 46.621∗∗∗ 47.166∗∗∗ 47.250∗∗∗ 47.499∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.49) (0.63) (0.40) (0.41) (0.46)
Difference -3.533∗∗∗ -3.854∗∗∗ -4.956∗∗∗ -3.682∗∗∗ -3.591∗∗∗ -4.442∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.68) (0.90) (0.55) (0.54) (0.65)
Explained
Expenditure -0.174 -0.181 -0.180 -0.069 -0.045 -0.093
(0.15) (0.17) (0.24) (0.11) (0.13) (0.19)
Admin. cap. -0.827∗∗∗ -0.922∗∗∗ -1.377∗∗ -0.553∗∗∗ -0.558∗∗ -1.040∗∗
(0.28) (0.33) (0.62) (0.21) (0.23) (0.42)
Legal req. -0.037 -0.032 -0.008 -0.057 -0.041 -0.001
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
F(Popul) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total -1.010∗∗ -1.094∗∗ -1.697∗∗ -0.997∗∗ -0.966∗∗ -1.564∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.49) (0.77) (0.39) (0.38) (0.56)
Unexplained
Expenditure -0.950 -0.205 2.139 1.520∗∗ 1.920 3.300∗
(0.84) (0.79) (1.65) (0.72) (1.34) (1.85)
Admin. cap. -2.564∗∗ -2.491∗∗ -4.728∗∗∗ -2.907∗∗∗ -2.803∗∗∗ -4.120∗∗∗
(1.08) (1.17) (1.48) (0.91) (1.04) (1.35)
Legal req. -0.401 -0.370 0.562 -0.284 -0.100 0.709
(0.68) (0.83) (1.49) (0.54) (0.50) (1.04)
F(Popul) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total -2.522∗∗∗ -2.760∗∗∗ -3.259∗∗∗ -2.685∗∗∗ -2.625∗∗∗ -2.878∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.69) (0.98) (0.57) (0.56) (0.73)
N 110 94 47 110 94 47
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of test score gaps between highly and low developed mu-
nicipalities, into explained and unexplained components. Columns indicate time pe-
riods from 2005, 2007 and 2010 onwards respectively. All models include population
controls (third degree polynomial). Standard errors clustered by municipality in paren-
theses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
8 Conclusion
In this paper I have taken advantage of an unusually favorable reform setting to show that
cities characterized by different levels of local development have reacted differently to higher
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autonomy over the public education service. Levels of municipal development embody the
wealth of local population and the amounts of own financial resources available. In the ten
years following the handover of responsibilities, cities in the highest development quartile
have significantly improved their student’s test score performance with respect to non-
autonomous counterparts; cities in the lowest development quartile instead display the
opposite test score trend. The test score gaps are growing stronger over time. The high-
developed group of cities invests in education more than the ad hoc financial transfers it
receives from the central government, while cities in the lowest development quartile barely
invest their financial allocation. The largest differences in investment shares between the
two groups are on “other education programs”, which include teacher formation, school
transport, planning and maintenance of school information systems and investments into
the efficiency of the local education authority itself. Spending differences are also found
on the infrastructure and school material investments, and on school staff. Moreover, high
developed municipalities perform significantly better on different administration quality
indicators with respect to low developed cities, which suggests additional explanations for
why, once given autonomy on the delivery of the public service, their results have started
drifting apart.
The findings of this study sound a note of caution in the design of decentralization reforms
in contexts in which subnational heterogeneity in wealth and development is an issue.
When handing responsibilities in public service delivery to the local level, less advantaged
localities may need additional training and support in order to avoid regional inequality to
grow, and decentralization to backfire for segments of the population.
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A APPENDIX
A Appendix
A.1 Maps
a) b)
c) d)
a) Colombia’s departments; b) Colombia’s municipalities; c) Municipalities which were
certified in education in 2002 (in black); d) Distribution of Municipal Development Index in
2001. In maps c) and d) the rural south-east is omitted to allow larger zoom on the densely
populated area.
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A.2 Population and Municipal Development Index distributions
Figure 5 shows the distributions of the municipal development measures by certification
status. Figure 6 extends Figure 1, illustrating population and MDI distributions for a wider
range of municipalities.
Figure 5: Distribution of MDI by certification
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A.3 Smoothness checks
Figure 7: Smoothness of municipal characteristics across the discontinuity
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A.4 Common pre-reform trend and falsification test
In order to dissolve residual doubts about whether municipalities on the two sides of the
certification cutoff may have been evolving in different ways over time also in absence
of the reform, I perform a test on the pre-reform trend. Lamentably the available pre-
reform years of test score data are only two (2000 and 2001), thus the test will look at the
changes between those two years only: the variable ∆Y = Y2001 − Y2000 is the outcome
variable in panel (a) of Table 12. No discontinuities nor patterns are discovered in the
results, neither across the four development subsamples nor through the interaction term
specification, confirming our belief that cities above and below the treatment cutoff are not
intrinsically different from each other. Panel (b) of the same table shows the results of
the RD estimation on pre-reform data, in order to verify that the test score patterns and
discontinuities identified in the main results were not already existing before the treatment.
Again the subsample analysis does not reveal any particular relationship between scores and
development before autonomy, while the interaction term specification does show a pattern
qualitatively similar to the post-reform scenario but significantly weaker in magnitude.
The overall conclusion I draw from the two panels of Table 12 is that before the 2001
decentralization reform, among municipalities sized around 100thousand inhabitants, there
was no evident relationship between development measures and student test scores levels
or growth rates. That relationship emerged only once cities were endowed with decisional
and financial autonomy over the public education service.
A.5 Progress over time using time bins
Expanding on Section 6.1.2, here I provide a different approach to the analysis of over-time
behavior of the certification effect. Instead of looking at progressively later time periods
as done in Table 4, Table 13 and Figure 8 show results of RD estimations performed on
successive and mutually exclusive 3-year bins. Standard errors are larger with respect to
the previous approach, as fewer data points enter each bin; the result patterns remain the
same and average effects can be observed growing over time.
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Table 13: Certification on Saber 11 test scores - progress over time
[ Regression Discontinuity Estimation ]
(a) Top 25% MDI ‘01
Mathematics Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2002-04 2005-07 2008-10 2011-12 2002-04 2005-07 2008-10 2011-12
Certified 1.591∗∗ 1.456∗ 2.209∗∗ 4.222∗∗ 2.642 1.331 1.134 2.294
(0.77) (0.83) (0.86) (1.69) (1.57) (1.15) (0.85) (1.41)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 75 75 75 50 75 75 75 50
R-sq. 0.072 0.119 0.134 0.260 0.054 0.075 0.143 0.164
(b) Bottom 25% MDI ‘01
Mathematics Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2002-04 2005-07 2008-2010 2011-12 2002-04 2005-07 2008-10 2011-12
Certified -0.714 -0.820 -1.940 -3.350∗∗ -1.523 -1.404 -1.412 -2.195∗
(0.52) (0.85) (1.31) (1.66) (1.04) (1.13) (0.89) (1.33)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,731 1,796 1,803 1,206 1,731 1,796 1,803 1,206
R-sq. 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.008
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
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A.6 Testing the difference between pre- and post-reform coefficients
In this section I formally test the difference between the RD coefficient estimates obtained
using post-reform data (Section 6.1) and the ‘falsification’ coefficients obtained using pre-
reform data (Section A.4), for both the high and the low development groups. Table 14
shows difference estimates and the associated standard errors. Focusing on mathematics
test scores, for high-developed cities the differences between pre-and post-reform coefficients
are statistically significant on every time span considered. For the low-developed group
instead, statistical difference is reached only once we look further away from the reform
date, at the years 2010-2012, suggesting a slower emergence of the reform effects on this
group. Coefficients on language scores do not reach statistically significant differences
between pre- and post-reform years.
Table 14: Differences between pre-and post-reform coefficients
Mathematics Spanish Language
2002> 2004> 2007> 2010> | 2002> 2004> 2007> 2010>
a) Top 25% 1.72* 1.89* 2.52** 3.32** 1.53 1.36 1.08 1.64
(0.87) (0.93) (1.08) (1.51) (0.94) (0.88) (0.84) (1.12)
b) Bot. 25% –1.05 –1.27 –1.70 –2.64* –0.95 –0.86 –1.00 –1.42
(0.98) (1.11) (1.29) (1.59) (0.99) (1.00) (1.05) (1.11)
N a) 325 275 200 125 325 275 200 125
N.mun. a) 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
N b) 7,713 6,521 4,786 2,986 7,713 6,521 4,786 2,986
N.mun. b) 603 602 603 603 603 602 603 603
Table of differences between pre-reform and post-reform coefficients of certification on stu-
dent test scores. Standard errors on differences in parentheses. Pre-reform coefficients
are obtained estimating RD model (1) on 2000-2001 student test scores. Post reform
coefficients are obtained estimating RD model (1) respectively on 2000-2012, 2004-2012,
2007-2012 and 2010-2012 student test scores. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
A.7 Financial resources of municipalities
In Table 15 I show how the level of local development embodies significant differences in
the amount of financial resources available to the municipal administration of autonomous
cities. Central government transfers do implement some redistribution, but differences in
local tax collection and capital gains sustain the advantage of high-developed cities with
respect to low-developed ones.
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Table 15: Percapita resources of certified municipalities in bottom and top development
quartile
Pre-reform (1998-2001) Post-reform (2002-2012)
Low 25% High 25% ∆% Low 25% High 25% ∆%
Total 154.63 343.71 75.88% 638.61 716.24 11.46%
(41.68) (122.75) (280.38) (250.99)
Transfers 113.72 82.08 –32.32% 480.20 260.36 –59.37%
(40.33) (30.98) (208.34) (88.40)
Tax collection 24.38 158.77 146.77% 54.33 254.57 129.65%
(13.72) (73.18) (28.34) (117.02)
Capital gains 10.23 29.76 97.67% 83.11 138.39 49.91%
(12.48) (19.35) (91.60) (87.31)
N.obs 23 14 37 90 64 154
N. municipalities 8 7 15 9 7 16
Table of mean annual percapita resources reported by municipalities in pre- and post-
reform years (in thousands of Colombian pesos), and percentage differences between
the two groups. Standard deviations in parentheses. Significance stars refer to t-tests
on the mean differences.
A.8 Descriptive evolution of test scores
Table 16 illustrates test score differences between highly developed (first quartile) and low
developed (last quartile) municipalities, at several points in time, for both Mathematics and
Spanish language. Differences are indicated separately for the group of cities that obtained
certification in 2002 and for the group that did not. In both groups, highly developed cities
always see higher test scores than low developed ones, even before the decentralization
reform. Nevertheless we can observe that for cities that obtained autonomy in 2002, the
test score gap between high and low developed members increases in the post-reform period
significantly more than what it does in the never-autonomous group of cities. These are
descriptive patterns that do not represent estimations of the causal effects of the 2002
reform (refer to the main results for such estimations): instead they inform us about the
bare over-time evolution of student performance in one group of cities relative to the other.
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Table 16: Over time evolution in test score differences
<2002 2002> 2004> 2007> 2010>
A) Mathematics
A1. Certified in 2002 1.09*** 2.83*** 3.16*** 3.79*** 4.81***
(0.28) (.62) (.68) (.82) (1.11)
A2. Not certified in 2002 0.01 1.40*** 1.52*** 2.02*** 2.74***
(.12) (.23) (.25) (.29) (.37)
A1. - A2. 1.08*** 1.43** 1.63** 1.77** 2.07*
(.31) (.65) (.71) (.87) (1.16)
B) Language
B1. Certified in 2002 2.50*** 3.32*** 3.33*** 3.45*** 4.29***
(.62) (3.32) (.70) (.68) (.84)
B2. Not certified in 2002 1.61*** 2.05*** 2.00*** 1.96*** 2.64***
(.30) (.25) (.24) (.24) (.30)
B1. - B2. 0.89 1.28* 1.32* 1.49** 1.65*
(.69) (.75) (.74) (.72) (.88)
N.obs 1,227 6,811 5,569 3,759 1,884
N. municipalities 621 628 628 628 628
Table of differences in test scores between cities in the highest and in the
lowest development quartile, all conditional on population (third-degree
polynomial). Differences are indicated at progressive points in time, and
separately for cities certified in 2002 (rows A1. and B1.) and for cities not
certified in 2002 (rows A2. and B2.). Standard errors clustered by munic-
ipality in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
A.9 Robustness checks
A.9.1 Regression Discontinuity Estimation
Different polynomials at each side of the cutoff
Table 17 replicates the results shown in Table 3, now allowing for a different polynomial on
each side of the certification cutoff. In econometric terms, this table shows the results of
fitting the models Yi = α+ τRDCi + βDi + f(Pi) + f(Pi)×Ci + i and Yi = α+ τRD0 Ci +
τRD1 Ci ∗ Di + βDi + f(Pi) + f(Pi) × Ci + i, where f(Pi) is a third-order polynomial of
population Pi. The results from the main section are robust to these alternative model
specifications.
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Table 17: Certification on Saber 11 test scores - by MDI ‘01 (2 polynomials)
(a) Mathematics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Bottom 25% Bottom 50% Top 50% Top 25% Interaction
Certified 0.176 -2.259∗ 1.211 -0.307 3.065∗∗∗ -2.267∗∗
(1.12) (1.37) (1.60) (1.27) (0.81) (0.88)
Certif.*MDI’01 perc. 0.038∗∗∗
(0.01)
MDI’01 percentile 0.023∗∗∗
(0.00)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,572 6,536 7,100 472 275 7,561
R-sq. 0.013 0.003 0.004 0.028 0.073 0.084
(b) Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Bottom 25% Bottom 50% Top 50% Top 25% Interaction
Certified 0.072 -3.602∗∗∗ 1.274 -0.432 2.379∗∗ -2.043∗∗
(1.14) (1.31) (1.60) (1.18) (1.10) (0.96)
Certif.*MDI’01 perc. 0.035∗∗∗
(0.01)
MDI’01 percentile 0.031∗∗∗
(0.00)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,572 6,536 7,100 472 275 7,561
R-sq. 0.018 0.003 0.004 0.029 0.073 0.124
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
Correction of statistical significance for multiple testing
If one considers columns (2) to (5) in Table 3 to be testing four separate hypotheses that
are related to each other in unknown ways, the α levels used as benchmarks should be
appropriately adjusted. Table 18 reports the results for municipalities in the highest and
lowest development quartile, with significance stars corrected for multiple testing according
to the method illustrated by Simes [1986]. Let p(1), p(2), p(3), p(4) be the p-values, ordered
from smallest to largest, for testing hypotheses H0 = {H1, H2, H3, H4}, each corresponding
to one of the four development categories used. Then each H(j) is rejected if p(j) ≤ jα/n
for any j = 1..4, and H0 is rejected if all H(j) are rejected.
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Table 18: Certification on Saber 11 test scores - Significance corrected for multiple testing
(a) Top 25% MDI ‘01
Mathematics Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post ‘02 Post ‘04 Post ‘07 Post ‘10 Post ‘02 Post ‘04 Post ‘07 Post ‘10
Certified 2.20* 2.37* 3.00** 3.80* 1.81 1.64 1.36 1.92
(0.86) (0.92) (1.06) (1.52) (1.14) (1.09) (1.04) (1.29)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 275 225 150 75 275 225 150 75
R-sq. 0.050 0.069 0.137 0.199 0.035 0.038 0.126 0.137
(b) Bottom 25% MDI ‘01
Mathematics Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post ‘02 Post ‘04 Post ‘07 Post ‘10 Post ‘02 Post ‘04 Post ‘07 Post ‘10
Certified –1.58 –1.80 –2.23 –3.17 –1.55 –1.47 –1.61 –2.03
(0.99) (1.12) (1.29) (1.60) (1.00) (1.02) (1.06) (1.12)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6,536 5,344 3,609 1,809 6,536 5,344 3,609 1,809
R-sq. 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.007
Effect of certification on student test scores. with significance stars corrected for multiple testing ac-
cording to the Simes (1986) method. * p(j)<j0.10/4, ** p(j)<j0.05/4, *** p(j)<j0.01/4, for any
j=1,2,3,4 of the ordered p-values.
A.9.2 Difference-in-Differences Estimation
Different cutoffs for the discontinuity sample
Table 19 shows the results of Table 5 employing different choices of the discontinuity-sample.
Columns (4) to (8) correspond to the same sample as used for the RD estimation.
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Figure 6: Population and MDI distributions
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Figure 8: Effect of certification over time
[ Regression Discontinuity Estimation ]
RD estimations of the effect of certification on average Math test scores, for certified municipalities in the
top 25% and the bottom 25% development range (triangles and circles series respectively). Capped spikes
indicate 95% confidence intervals on point estimates.
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Chapter 3
New Teachers for Colombia: Is Quality Control Working?
Abstract
In 2002 the career of Colombian public school teachers was significantly reformed through
the introduction of a selective entry competition and of further quality incentives. This paper
estimates how the new quality-screened teachers impact students’ high school performance.
We exploit the fact that the novel regulation applied only to newly hired teachers, whereas
those already in office in 2002 remained exempt, creating a mix of New-Regulation and Old-
Regulation teachers in Colombian schools. Using data at the school-year-subject level, we
eliminate any school-level confounders and associate the proportion of New-Regulation teachers
to the variation in student test scores. We pin down a positive and significant, although not
very large, effect of New Regulation teachers on student performance. New Regulation teachers
have decreasing marginal returns, are more effective in larger schools and when surrounded
by colleagues holding postgraduate degrees. We also document that the enforcement of the
New Regulation has been somewhat unsatisfactory, since in the period 2008-2013 around 30%
of all New Regulation teachers are employed in temporary positions without having passed
the compulsory entry exam. These teachers have lower and less robust impacts on student
performance.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
The opening words of the 2016 OECD report on Colombian education read ‘Colombia has made
education a main priority to improve the economic and social prosperity of the country and pledged
more resources to this sector than any other policy area’ [OECD, 2016]. Indeed, over the past two
decades the country has been transforming its education system on several aspects, and in this paper
we are focusing on the quality assurance mechanisms that have been introduced to the teaching
profession in 2002 in the effort of improving its standards.
Teacher hiring systems that feature competition on skills, such as national entry exams and
performance rankings, may by now be common in the Western world but much less so in Latin
America, Asia and Africa. Before the reform, in Colombia the career of public teacher was open
to any candidate possessing the citizenship and given levels of education. The appointment of
candidates into the open vacancies followed opaque evaluation processes, and once entered the
career, salary and rank upgrades were based on seniority. This system lent itself to dynamics
of corruption and clientelism [Duarte, 2001], beyond not creating any incentives for individuals to
invest in their teaching skills and subject knowledge. Sadly, this type of structure is still common in
many developing countries around the world1, making policy advice and careful reform evaluation
in this context particularly urgent.
This paper analyzes the consequences of the introduction of a broad set of quality controls to the
public teacher profession in Colombia. The quality controls can be summarized by (1) a public entry
contest, that establishes the order in which candidates will choose vacancies 2) a probation period
of 4 to 12 months, which confirms the appointment to the vacancies upon successful completion 3)
continuous evaluation along the career, with yearly performance reports by the school headmaster,
that can result in termination of the employment if unsatisfactory 4) salary upgrades being made
conditional on skills evaluations, which are carried out through a written examination. We measure
the impact of the reform on student performance at high school level, and find that bringing the
share of New Regulation teachers from 0 to 1 in a given school year and subject increases the
average performance of students by about 6% of a standard deviation.
We further explore heterogeneities in the effect across teacher and school characteristics. We
1We found many similarities between the pre-reform Colombian context and the current ones in many Latin
American countries, such as Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Panama’. For
similar contexts in South Asia and the rest of the world, find discussions and details in Murillo et al. [2007], Hanushek
[2009] and Hanushek and Woessmann [2012].
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find that the marginal effect of New Regulation teachers reaches more than double the average
magnitude when the share of these teachers is still low (< 20%) in a given school year and subject:
in other words, marginal returns are initially high and then decreasing. The effect of new teachers
also depends positively on the number of colleagues in the year and subject, and on the share of
postgraduate-holding colleagues. We are not able to pin down any significant relationship between
the effect of New Regulation teachers on student performance and the average entry contest score
of these teachers.
We also examine teacher retention patterns in the education system, and conclude that the
professional incentive framework seems to be working partially, as having a postgraduate degree
and scoring higher in the entry test is associated with longer permanence in the system, but the very
top-scorers are observed dropping out faster than the median ones, suggesting a lower attractiveness
of the profession for such teachers.
Finally, our empirical analysis suggests that loopholes in the new legislation may have allowed
a conspicuous fraction of teachers to evade some of the quality assurance provisions, by teaching
under the status of “temporaries” without having entered the career through the regular path.
These teachers have a lower and less robust effect on student performance.
The next section briefly reviews the closest related works; Section 3 gives a thorough description
of the most important aspects of the 2002 reform; Section 4 describes the data we use; Section 5
details the empirical strategy employed; Section 6 illustrates and discusses results, followed by
concluding remarks in Section 10.
2 Closely related literature
This paper contributes to the flourishing literature on teacher quality, which divides into several
themes: assessing how much of the variation in student outcomes is explained by the teacher effect
2; understanding which teacher characteristics make teachers better 3; understanding which type of
policies and interventions are effective in making teachers better or attracting and retaining better
teachers4. The answer to our main exercise, quantifying the impact of New Regulation teachers
2See for example Chetty et al. [2014], Rivkin et al. [2005], Rockoff [2005] and, for an excellent review, Hanushek
and Rivkin [2012].
3For example Rockoff et al. [2011], Kane et al. [2008], Gordon et al. [2006]
4For example Hanushek et al. [2004], Figlio [2001]
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on student performance, shall provide a reference point about the effectiveness of reforms such
as the Colombian one5 in providing better teachers. The results of our secondary analyses on
heterogeneity and retention patterns help towards understanding the channels of the reform effect,
and suggests which types of teachers may find the profession appealing under a framework such as
the Colombian one.
Closest to this paper both in scope and methodology we found work by Ome(2013, 2012), who
also uses a fixed effects methodology to estimate the impact of the Colombian teacher career reform
on primary and high school test scores. He uses three years of data on teacher records and student
scores (2002, 2008 and 2009); he exploits within-school, across-year variation in the share of new-
regulation teachers to identify the effect of the new teachers. While pinning down positive effects at
primary school level and on student dropout rates, he finds no effect of the New Regulation teachers
on test scores at high school level. We think that the little amount of within-school variation in
teacher composition across the three years might be the reason for the negative finding (low testing
power).
3 The 2002 reform of the teacher career
3.1 Pre-reform situation and reasons for the reform
Before 2002, the teaching profession in Colombia was regulated by Decree 2277 of year 1979,
and successive modifications. The appointment and transfers of teachers were considered admin-
istrative acts, and thus the responsibility of department governors and/or mayors6. There were
requirements on the education levels for teachers at the different school grades. The scheme for
career upgrades was based on combinations of years of service, education level and attendance of
training workshops. Finally, teachers were guaranteed to remain in service until retirement age
except in cases of ascertained severe misconduct7. Overall, the legal framework was characterized
by very little transparency in procedures, excessive protection of employed teachers, and lack of
incentives towards the improvement of skills and teaching performance. Clientelism and politiciza-
5in a context similar to pre-reform Colombia, which is characteristic still today of many countries in Latin
America, see footnote 1.
6See Art. 106 Ley 115 /1994
7Only in 1994 the law started to mention public contests as a desirable method of appointment of teachers, but
these never took place until the 2002 reform.
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tion of teacher appointments were substantial and well-known issues; far too often public schools
were used as ‘placement pools’ for relatives and connections of influent personalities (see excellent
descriptions and discussions in Duarte [2001] and Duarte [2003]).
3.2 The new public contest procedure
Teachers that have been entering the profession from January 1st 2002 onwards have to go through
a public contest procedure in order to be assigned a vacancy. Contests are called separately for
each education authority (department or certified municipality) and specify the vacancies available
on their territories, and candidates must choose the one education authority they wish to apply
to in that year. The contest is based on a score system and serves the purpose of establishing a
rank among applicants, which determines the order in which successful candidates will be allowed
to choose their preferred vacancies. The stages of the contest and their corresponding weights are
summarized in Table 1; the subsequent subsections detail each stage further.
Table 1: Stages of the entry contest
Purpose Use of score
Minimum
threshold Weight in contest Responsibility
T* H*
Exam
Teaching aptitude,
subject knowledge
Eliminatory
and ranking
60% (T)
70% (H) 55% 45% ICFES21
Exam
Psychometric
test Ranking - 10% 10% ICFES
CV
Credentials
evaluation Ranking - 20% 30%
CNSC10 or
delegate
Interview
Behavioral
evaluation Ranking - 15% 15%
CNSC or
delegate
Note: * T = teachers; H = headmasters
Source: MEN [2006]; MEN [2012]; GEARD [2013]
The exam
At the first stage of the contest, candidates sit an exam which is identical across the country and is
administered and evaluated centrally by governmental agencies8; it is structured into three modules
8ICFES (Instituto Colombiano para la Evaluación de la Educación) and CNSC (Comisión Nacional del Servicio
Civil). The exam registration fee is below 9 USD (2012-2013 contest). The exam questions are elaborated by the
National University, the largest public university in Colombia.
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testing teaching aptitude, subject knowledge and psychometric values9. Candidates who do not
score a minimum of 60 /100 points on each of the three modules must exit the contest. For surviving
candidates, the exam stage will represent 65% of their global score (55% for school directors).
The evaluation of credentials
Scores are assigned to academic degrees, additional training courses, academic productions and
publications, past experience, past teaching evaluations (where present) and career awards, accord-
ing to official tables set by CNSC10, the body in charge of this stage of the context. The credentials
score represents 20% of the total (30% for aspiring school directors).
The interview
The interview of candidates is also responsibility of CNSC, who may nominate local delegate bodies
to decentralize the process. Typically universities and other certified higher education institutions
are delegated and form ad hoc interview committees under the supervision of CNSC. The committee
questions each candidate in person and the evaluation accounts for the remaining 15% of the global
contest score.
3.3 The probation period
Once having completed the public contest and chosen one of the available vacancies according to
his or her priority rank, the aspiring teacher starts a probation period that lasts up to the end
of the ongoing academic year (minimum four months). At the end of probation, the candidate’s
performance is evaluated by the school headmaster, and conditional on a positive evaluation the
new teacher takes permanent possession of the chair. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in practice,
very little further selection is happening at this stage, i.e. that virtually all teachers reaching the
probation period are then appointed to the chair; in Table 5 we show statistical evidence supporting
9The ‘aptitudes’ module aims at assessing the candidate’s ability to appropriately deal with language and num-
bers, and his knowledge of basic pedagogical concepts. The second module evaluates proficiency and skills of the
candidate in his subject speciality. The psychometric test evaluates the candidate’s hypothetical responses when
facing pedagogical or institutional issues arising in the everyday teaching life.
10Comisión Nacional del Servicio Civil. It is an autonomous and independent body, located at the highest level in
the structure of the Colombian State. It has legal identity and administrative, financial and managerial independence,
and it is not part of any sector of the government authority. (Description translated from the institutional web-
page of CNSC, http://www.cnsc.gov.co/index.php/institucional/direccionamiento-estrategico/quienes-somos-cnsc;
fetched on 19 Jan 2015)
82
3.4 Permanent evaluation and incentives 4 DATA
this claim.
3.4 Permanent evaluation and incentives
The New Regulation introduced permanent evaluation practices, aiming at ensuring a continued
satisfactory performance by teachers, as well as providing them with incentives to improve over
time.
The first form of permanent evaluation consists of yearly assessments compiled by school head-
masters and reported to the local education authority, in which the headmaster comments on the
teacher’s performance following standardized criteria11. Two consecutive years of negative evalua-
tions lead to discontinuation of the employment as a teacher. This change is important especially if
compared to the over-protected status that teachers were enjoying under the old career regulation.
The second form of permanent evaluation and incentives brought in by the 2002 reform was
making career upgrades conditional on passing public examinations that evaluate teachers’ subject
knowledge and teaching skills (Evaluación de Competencias). The new examination was added to
the existing requirements of possessing the level of education required for the upper level, and of
having spent 3 years at the current one (MEN [2013b]). The career structure and the corresponding
pay scale of New Regulation teachers is different with respect to Old Regulation ones, and the two
are illustrated in Table A.2, along with 2008 salary levels. Noticeable changes between the Old
and the New Regulation are the introduction of a postsecondary specialization as the minimum
education level for teachers12, and the reward of higher education degrees through higher salaries
for teachers holding them.
4 Data
Data on teachers
Data on teachers is available thanks to a the yearly information reporting procedure that is being
enforced by the Ministry of Education across all public schools of the country13. Schools are required
11Evaluación anual de desempeño laboral. The current evaluation procedures are regulated in detail through
Decree 3782 /2007 by the Ministry of Education.
12Bringing the minimum years of education from 11 (secondary education) to 13 or 14 (postsecondary specializa-
tion).
13Resolución 166 /2003 and following versions.
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to give details on their pupils, staff and infrastructure, through the standardized formats set by the
Ministry every year14. We have individual data on teachers at all public schools of the country for
the years 2008 to 2013; each record includes the teacher’s demographics, education level, school of
placement, teaching subject, teaching level, type of contract, date first hired in the public education
system, and salary level.
Teacher test scores, and two types of New Regulation teachers
Using their unique national ID document, we managed to match 81.15% of all New Regulation high
school teachers15 to their entry exam scores. In the analysis we will use the most recent test score
for each teacher, as the most up-to-date measure of his or her skills; Figure 1 graphs the density
of these scores. Surprisingly, the mass of scores is below the minimum requirement of 60 points is
very large. A worrying 34% of all new-regulation teachers who were holding a teaching position
over the period 2008-201316 did not meet the minimum test score requirement on their most recent
attempt17. Table 2 shows that a mere minority of these teachers have obtained a sufficient score at
some point in the past18, leaving almost 13 thousand subjects in teaching positions without having
ever passed the compulsory entry exam19. The law allows such individuals to fill teaching vacancies
temporarily, and only in the absence of legitimate candidates willing to fill the positions. In fact,
Table 2 also reveals that 89% of teachers that have never passed the exam are holding temporary
positions and 6% are registered as being on probation, while the remaining 5% has remarkably
managed to land a permanent position.
These statistics split the group of New Regulation teachers into two potentially very different
subgroups: New Regulation teachers who have at some point passed the entry exam and New
14The reasons behind the collection of this administrative data is for the Ministry to be able to monitor the
status of the public education sector and to identify needs and priorities. School headmasters are in charge of
ensuring the correct collection and reporting of the information, and of passing the data onto the local education
authority (“education secretariat” of the department or certified municipality), which in turn reports to the Ministry
of Education.
15That is 43,197 out of 53,234 New Regulation high school teachers. Overall we were able to match to their
test scores 115,462 out of 145,724 New Regulation teachers (79,23%). The unmatched part is largely due to a large
number of missing IDs in the 2006 edition of the entry examination.
16(and whom we were able to match with their scores)
17The figure could be reduced by matching the 2012 entry contest data, that was not available to us at the time
of this project. If all teachers hired in 2012 and 2013 had regularly passed the exam, the percentage of those not
having passed it would reduce to 28.36%.
18And have been retaking the exam, for example, in order to move to a different education authority.
19And almost 37 thousand teachers overall, including the school levels other than secondary. These figures are a
lower bound to the true ones, as we are missing the test scores of about 20% of our sample.
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Figure 1: Entry exam scores of teachers observed over 2008-2013
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Density of entry test scores (most recent score of each teacher); bin width = 1.33 points; normal
curve is overlaid.
Table 2: Teachers with most recent score below 60
Type of position Never above 60 Above 60 in past Total
Permanent 676 429 1,105
5.24% 23.04% 7.49%
Temporary 11,442 1,261 12,703
88.73% 67.72% 86.08%
Probation 777 172 949
6.03% 9.24% 6.43%
Total 12,895 1,862 14,757
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Regulation teachers who have not, and we will refer to these two groups as “New Regulation
Passed” and “New Regulation Not Passed” in the remainder of the paper.
Data on student outcomes
We will focus on high school test outcomes. The Colombian high school test is called Saber11
and is sat by students after 11 years of schooling, at completion of secondary school and before
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university20. Saber11 test data is collected by ICFES21 and it is the most complete among the
standardized tests being conducted at different school grades; it is widely accepted as the reference
examination to evaluate the quality of Colombian secondary education. Saber11 evaluates a range
of seven school subjects, which are the same in all secondary schools22; test scores range from 0 to
100 in each subject and are standardized by subject at the national level, so that each student’s score
is informative about his/her position relative to the national average in that subject. Individual-
level Saber11 test scores are made available by ICFES for the years 2000 to 2012, with information
about the school and municipality to which each student belongs. We will use years 2008-2013 and
associate them with the available teacher data.
Matching students and teachers
Unfortunately we do not have information on class groups, and thus we are unable to achieve a
perfect match between teachers and the students they actually taught. The closest match we can
obtain is between teachers teaching at secondary school level (years 6 to 11) in school i, year t and
subject s, and the Saber11 (year 11) student test scores in the same school i, year t and subject
s. Therefore our unit of observation is a school-year-subject cell, and we collapse and average the
individual data to that level. Our main outcome variable is “Average test score”, our regressor of
interest is “Share of New Regulation teachers”, which is given by the number of teachers hired under
the New Regulation over the total number of teachers teaching the given subject at secondary level,
in the given school, the given year.
5 Empirical strategy
We are interested in measuring the impact that the introduction of New Regulation teachers has
had on student test scores. In our years of reference, 2008-2013, both New Regulation and Old
Regulation teachers were teaching in Colombian secondary schools, and we will exploit this fact in
20Schooling years 10 and 11 are not compulsory and are attended by around 41% of the eligible school popula-
tion (2012 data: Sistema Nacional de Indicadores - Tasa de cobertura neta - Ministerio de Educación Nacional -
http://menweb.mineducacion.gov.co)
21Instituto Colombiano para la Evaluación de la Educación. The same agency also administers the national tests
taken by students at different stages of their career. It is a governmental agency with social scope within the sector
of public education; a national, decentralized public entity of special nature, with own legal identity, administrative
independence and own assets; it is bound to the Ministry of Education. (Description translated from the institutional
webpage of ICFES, http://www.icfes.gov.co/informacion-institucional/marco-legal; fetched on 19 Jan 2015)
22Mathematics; Spanish Language and Literature; Biology; Chemistry; Physics; Philosophy and English.
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order to identify the effect of the former. We also exploit the fact that within each school, students
sit the exam on different subjects. We use heterogeneity in student performances and in the New
Regulation teacher shares across subject, within the same school. Our main specification would be:
yits = β0 + β1SNPits + β2SNNPits + βkXkits + αit + αs + eits (1)
where the unit of observation is at the school(i)-year(t)-subject(s) level, αit is a school-year fixed
effect, αs is the subject fixed effect and eits is the residual. Our coefficient of interest is mainly β1,
on the share of New Regulation teachers that have passed the entry exam (SNP ), as this is the
type of teachers the reform has been aiming at producing. Secondarily, we are also interested in
coefficient β2, on the share of New Regulation teachers that have not passed the exam (SNNP ),
as it can provide an interesting comparison to β1 and help us understanding the channels of the
effect. This specification enables us to rule out any school-level factor or shocks which may induce
selection of teachers into schools, or cause correlation between the share of New teachers and the
student scores, such as school characteristics of both time-invariant and time-varying nature.
Similar regression models which do not feature school fixed effects are exposed to the bias
induced by non-random selection of new-regulation teachers into schools. Those who feature school-
but not school-year fixed effects (as in Ome [2012a]) are able to account for time-invariant sources
of bias but still exposed to the spurious correlation between yit and SNPit or SNNPit deriving
from time-varying factors or shocks, such as changes in school management or shocks to school
resources.
The next section presents our main results. Importantly, we find significant differences between
the output of the more naïve school-fixed-effects model and that of the school-year-fixed-effects
strategy we use.
6 Main results
Table 3 shows our main results, obtained estimating model (1) on the data previously described. We
estimate a positive and significant effect of New Regulation - Passed teachers on student Saber11
scores, in a magnitude of about 0.20 points increase in the average score for that subject when
the share of new-regulation teachers goes from 0 to 1 in that subject (6% of a subject standard
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deviation; 2% of a student standard deviation). Our preferred school-year-fixed effects specification
in column (5) estimates an effect of New Regulation - Passed teachers by two thirds higher than
the one we obtain through a regular school-fixed-effects model (column (3)). Estimations obtained
without any within-school variation are very far off, reflecting strong sorting of teachers into schools
(columns (1 and 2)).
Table 3: The effect of New Regulation teachers on student performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share New Regulation Passed –0.35*** 0.89*** 0.12*** 0.20*** 0.20***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Share New Regulation Not Passed –1.83*** –0.36*** –0.03 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 0.03* 0.02** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age^2 –0.00* –0.00*** –0.00*** –0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience 0.12*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience^2 –0.00*** –0.00*** –0.00*** –0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share postgrad degree 0.94*** 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Subject FE 3 3 3 3 3
School FE 3 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3
School-year FE 3 3
Subject-specific trends 3
Mean(y) 43.33 43.33 43.33 43.33 43.33
sd(y) 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29
N.obs 151,178 151,178 151,178 151,178 151,178
N.groups . . 5,969 29,609 29,609
R-squared 0.19 0.20 0.68 0.79 0.79
Note: SE clustered by school in parentheses. Each observation is subject ‘s’ in school ‘i’ in year
‘y’. No fixed effects in columns (1) and (2), school fixed effects in column (3), school-year fixed
effects in columns (4) and (5). * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
We estimate a positive and significant effect on student test scores also by New Regulation
teachers who have not passed their entry exam, in a magnitude of about 0.14 points (4% of a
subject- or 1.4% of a student standard deviation). The effect of this category of teachers will prove
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less robust to the inclusion of additional time and experience controls with respect to the effect of
fully accredited teachers (see Table 7), but its magnitude is nevertheless non trivial. We devote
section 7.4 to the discussion of this category, as we reflect upon the possible channels through which
the reform operated. In the Appendix we also show estimation results obtained considering New
Regulation teachers as a single group, without distinguishing between those who have passed the
entry exam and those who have not (Table 3).
6.1 Falsification test
Our main identification assumption is the absence of sorting of teachers across subjects, within
each school and school year. This assumption would be threatened if we were facing dynamics such
as subject-wise selective hiring, i.e. the targeted hiring of New Regulation teachers into a specific
subject (within a school and school year). The legislative framework regulating Colombian public
education is not suited to such dynamics, given the very limited freedom and decisional power that
is left in the hands of single schools and principals - and hiring and firing of personnel is not among
their rights23. Nevertheless, in order to lift any remaining doubts on these matters, we perform
a falsification test that aims at detecting subject-level correlation between pre-reform student test
scores and the post-reform shares of New Regulation teachers in that subject. In other words, we
estimate our main Model 1 using 2000 and 2001 test scores on the left-hand side, instead of post-
reform scores. If New Regulation teachers were selectively entering subjects that ‘needed’ them
because of bad performance, or that ‘attracted’ them because of good performance, a negative or
positive correlation ought to emerge. Table 4 reports the coefficients on SNP and SNNP for each
combination of pre-reform scores and post-reform teacher plant. As we can see, no correlation is
detected in any of these combinations, bringing further support to our claim of absence of selection
of teachers at the subject level.
6.2 Nonlinear and interaction effects
In this section we explore nonlinearities in the effect of New Regulation teachers on student subject
performance. Firstly, we are interested in whether the marginal return to New Regulation teachers
is constant across their share, or varying with it. We augment our main model (1) with the quadratic
23Except the evaluation post-probation period from 2002 onwards (see Section 7.2)
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Table 4: Falsification: Share of New Regulation teachers on pre-reform student test scores
Student test scores 2000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Share New Regulation Passed 0.06 0.01 0.01 –0.04 –0.01 –0.02
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Share New Regulation Not Passed 0.02 0.03 0.03 –0.05 0.01 0.00
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08)
N.obs 11,715 12,395 12,395 13,366 14,188 15,204
N.groups 2,595 2,697 2,697 2,828 2,945 3,057
Student test scores 2001 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Share New Regulation Passed –0.05 –0.01 –0.03 –0.08 –0.09 –0.01
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Share New Regulation Not Passed –0.01 0.03 –0.02 –0.03 –0.08 –0.02
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
N.obs 12,103 13,077 12,831 13,818 14,694 15,769
N.groups 2,696 2,783 2,798 2,932 3,054 3,171
Note: Pre-reform student test scores regressed on each post-reform year’s share of New Regula-
tion teachers. SE clustered by school in parentheses. Each observation is subject ‘s’ in school
‘i’ in year 2000 or 2001. School and subject fixed effects, and all controls of Table 3 - model
(5) are also included. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
and cubic terms SNP 2its and SNP 3its, allowing for a nonlinear response to increasing SNP , the share
of New Regulation teachers who have passed their exam; Figure 2(a) shows the results graphically
and Table A.8 numerically24. We find the marginal effect to be highest at low shares, starting
as high as 0.75 points (22.8% of a school-year-subject standard deviation) and declining with the
share, becoming statistically insignificant when SNP reaches values of around 40%.
In Figures 2(b) and (d) and the corresponding Tables A.7 and A.10 we can see how the ef-
fectiveness of New Regulation teachers appears to increase with the number of colleagues in the
year-subject, maybe suggesting positive network effects, and with the share of postgraduate-holding
colleagues. Figure 2(c) and Table A.9 show an attempt at pinning down heterogeneous effects by
quintiles of average entry tests scores of teachers: the Table reveals positive associations between
student test scores and higher test performance of teachers, but the interactions with SNP do
not display interesting patterns. Finally, Figure 2(e) and Table A.11 show us that there are some
differences in the effect of New Regulation teachers by subject taught, with the weakest effects on
24In all panels of Figure 2 and the corresponding Tables, the sample has been limited to subject-years with 11 or
less teachers (5 school-subject-year cells dropped).
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English foreign language and Philosophy, and the strongest on Mathematics.
Figure 2: Marginal effects by different subject-year characteristics
The following panels plot the marginal effect of ‘Share New Passed’ on student test scores when the
variable is interacted with other characteristics of the same subject-year: the share of New Passed
itself and its square (own interactions), the number of total teachers, the average entry scores of
New Regulation teachers. Capped lines indicate 95% point-wise confidence intervals.
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7 Channels of the effect
7.1 Selection on skills at entry
The public contest at entry is certainly the most prominent among the novelties that were intro-
duced by the 2002 reform of the teacher career. Its purpose is allowing the most suitable candidates
to become school teachers, while keeping the less desirable ones out of the profession - and seeking
to measure suitability with transparent and meritocratic criteria, as opposed to the politicized se-
lections and placements that were common before the reform. The first stage of the contest, the
written exam that is meant to evaluate knowledge and teaching aptitudes, accounts for a major
share of the total score for a candidate (see the contest structure in Table 1). The minimum score
threshold required in the exam seems to represent a tough hurdle for many candidates, and the
first four contests saw exam-passing rates of only about 30% on average (Table A.1). Keeping in
mind that we found indication of a positive correlation between the average entry test scores of
New Regulation teaches and student performance (Table A.9), the data does suggest that the entry
exam, by cutting out an important fraction of candidates with low test scores, is one of the channels
through which the positive impact of New Regulation teachers is materializing.
7.2 Selection on the probation period
The probation period that teachers begin after having successfully passed the entry contest and
selected their preferred vacancy, is a further selection mechanism that the 2002 reform put in
place. School headmasters observe and evaluate the new teachers during their first months of
employment, and have the power to end their employment if deemed unfit for the job. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that, in practice, the firing of teachers after their probation period is a rare
event, due to the fact that headmasters do not wish to incur in the hassle of potential appeals and
legal disputes that fired teachers would recur to. We test this claim using our six years of school
censuses (2008 to 2013) and constructing an individual-level panel that records the type of position
that each New Regulation teacher holds each year: permanent, temporary25 and in probation. We
then estimate a model Yit = β0 + β1Tempit + β2Probit + it, where Yit = 1 if the teacher is still
25There are two types of temporary statuses: ‘Temporary in permanent vacancy’, meaning that the vacancy is
waiting to be filled with a new permanent occupant, and ‘Temporary in temporary vacancy’ means that the vacancy
has a permanent occupant who is only temporarily away. We have grouped the two categories into a single one for
our analysis.
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in the panel in period t + 1 and 0 otherwise26; Temp and Prob are mutually exclusive dummies
indicating the type of position held in year t (omitted category is Perm, permanent position). We
then also add the Ageit controls to the baseline (columns (2) and (4)). In Columns (3) and (4) we
adopt a random effects specification, adding individual teacher effects αi to our model. All columns
report the odds ratios from our maximum-likelihood logit estimates. The results of Table 5 may
tell a different story with respect to the previous anecdotal evidence: teachers on probation are
only about 80% as likely as permanent position teachers to still be recorded system the year after.
Nevertheless, we do not know the reasons behind the sample attrition and we are thus unable to
distinguish between teachers who have voluntarily quit their job and those sacked. It may be that
the first year of employment regularly sees higher dropout rates with respect to the following ones,
due to initial adjustment or unmet expectations of new entrants. In conclusion, even though we
do find considerably higher teacher dropout rates associated with their probation period, we are
unable to conclusively say whether this provision of the reform is implementing selection on new
teachers.
26We do not use Yi,2013, which is equal to 0 for all subjects, since the panel ends in 2013.
94
7.3 Turnover and discontinuation of employment 7 CHANNELS OF THE EFFECT
Table 5: Panel retention by type of position held (New Regulation teachers)
Logit RE Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Temporary position 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.19*** 0.19***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Probation period 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.78*** 0.78***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age bins No Yes No Yes
N.obs 138,869 138,865 138,869 138,865
N.groups 48,172 48,171
Note: Odds ratios displayed. Outcome variable: Y=1 if the teacher is still in the panel the
following year, 0 otherwise. Year 2013 excluded. Columns (1) and (2): SE clustered by indi-
vidual in parentheses. Columns (3) and (4): Observed Information Matrix SE in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
7.3 Turnover and discontinuation of employment
We can distinguish discontinuation of employment for Colombian public teachers into forced and
voluntary. It is forced when the teacher is dismissed from his or her employment against his or her
will, and it is voluntary when the teacher leaves the profession by own decision.
In section 3.4 we discussed how new-regulation teachers, contrary to their old-regulation col-
leagues, face the threat of seeing their employment discontinued for reasons other than severe
misconduct. As an incentive to effort and good teaching, discontinuation of employment may hap-
pen due to two consecutive years of unsatisfactory scores on the performance evaluations which are
carried out by school headmasters.
Unfortunately we do not have access to data on these yearly performance evaluations, but we
can start exploring the question of whether new regulation teachers are experiencing significant
screening even once their careers are underway by examining in-career dropout patterns. Table
6 shows maximum likelihood logit estimations of the model Yi = β0 + β1NewRegi + i, where
Yit = 1 if the teacher is still in the panel in period t+1 and 0 otherwise; and NewRegi is a dummy
taking value 1 for new-regulation teachers and 0 for old-regulation ones; again we also add the
Agei control to the baseline. In Columns (3)-(4) we adopt a random effects specification, adding
individual teacher effects αi to our model27. Conditional on having reached the permanent-position
27In this case fixed effects estimation is not feasible, as the new-regulation or old-regulation status is time-invariant.
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stage, New Regulation teachers actually display higher panel retention rates than their traditional-
regulation colleagues, even controlling for age28. In conclusion, we are unable to find any evidence
for high rates of forced employment termination occurring among teacher subject to the reformed
rules, and we are inclined towards ruling out this channel as an important selection mechanism.
Table 6: Panel retention per type of teacher regulation (permanent-position teachers)
Logit RE Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New Regulation 1.978*** 1.516*** 1.229*** 2.409*** 1.759*** 1.313***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.022) (0.044) (0.038) (0.026)
Age 0.979*** 0.972*** 0.975*** 0.971***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year dummies No No Yes No No Yes
N.obs 309,383 309,383 309,383 309,383 309,383 309,383
N.groups 94,285 94,285 94,285
Note: Outcome variable: Y=1 if the teacher is still in the panel the following year, 0 otherwise.
Columns (1)-(3): SE clustered by individual in parentheses. Columns (4)-(6): Observed Infor-
mation Matrix SE in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
7.4 New-Regulation teachers that have not passed the entry exam
Let us now turn to discuss the results we obtained on the second category of New Regulation
teachers, those who have not passed their entry exam (the SNNP variable, for “Share New Not
Passed”). In the main results of Table 3, column (5), we see that the positive impact of these
teachers on student outcomes is estimated at around 70% of the impact of teachers who did pass
the entry exam. Teachers who have not passed the exam can be employed temporarily, in absence
of fully accredited candidates. Nevertheless, they have not officially entered the teaching career
and are thus not eligible for any career upgrades: their salary is locked to the first step (step
A) of the level to which they would belong if they passed the exam29 (see Table A.2 for an idea
about numbers). These teachers, the vast majority of which occupies temporary positions (see
Table 2), is also at constant risk of being replaced by candidates who do pass the exam, as only
the latter are entitled to take permanent possession of vacancies. The positive impact that this
28Various other flexible forms of controlling for age have been tested without significant changes in the results,
and have thus been omitted in the output.
29Decree 624/2008.
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category of teachers has on student test scores, thus still improving on Old Regulation teachers, can
probably be attributed to the effort that they are exerting towards obtaining their full accreditation
and overcoming their precarious status in the system. In this regard, it is important to keep in
mind that even though they have obtained a score below 60, these teachers have attempted the
entry exam at least once, and almost 60% of them have attempted it multiple times30, and are
thus likely to have gone through preparation and quality assurance procedures similarly to their
successful colleagues. Moreover, they do possess the preliminary requirements needed to access the
entry contest, including the higher education level requirements introduced by the reform. These
considerations may explain quite well our finding of a still positive but about 30% lower impact on
student test scores that these non-accredited teachers are bringing about, and are consistent with
our previous deductions about a positive selection being implemented through the entry exam and
possibly through the probation period.
8 Exploring time patterns
We further pursue the understanding of how the two regulations translate into career differences
by analyzing survival patterns in Old and New public teachers. A public teacher becomes “at risk
of failing” the year in which he/she enters the teacher profession, and “fails” the year in which
he/she exits it for whichever reason. The survival analysis performed in this section is based on
the individual-level information recorded over the direct observation period 2008-201331, and on
the retrospective information about each teacher’s first hiring year32. The survival time of teachers
hired before the start of our observation window in 2008 is treated as conditional on having survived
already up to that year33. In the whole analysis, the sample has been limited to exclude teachers
who voluntarily switched from the Old to the New Regulation (by taking the exam) and the other
cases in which the regulation recorded is inconsistent with the year of hiring (3,902 teachers), as
well as the teachers who are recorded as not exercising in an educational structure (1,899 teachers).
The remaining sample consists of 118,117 teachers teaching one of the Saber 11 test subjects at
307,392 out of 12,895 teachers have attempted the exam 2, 3 or 4 times between 2002 and 2009
31Or a subset of those years, for teachers hired during that time span.
32The first hiring date is the date in which the teacher was hired for the first time as a public school teacher.
33i.e. we are in the presence of “left censoring”. See the excellent discussion in Wooldridge [2010], ch. 22.3.3.
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secondary level 34, among which 64,883 belong to the Old regulation and 53,234 to the New one
(43,197 with matched test scores).
Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier survivor functions by regulation
0
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Kaplan-Meier survivor functions for teachers belonging to the new regulation (solid line) and the
old regulation (dashed line), and 95% confidence intervals.
As a first exercise, we estimate the survival functions corresponding to old regulation and
new regulation teachers non-parametrically, and plot them in Figure A.2. Notice that since our
observation window spans the years 2008-2013 and the new teacher regulation was implemented in
2002, any old-regulation teacher we observe has already spent at least 6 years in the public education
system (which explains the ‘shifted’ starting point of the dashed curve in Figure A.2). On the other
hand, the most senior new-regulation teachers we observe have spent not more than 11 years in the
system (which explains the ‘early’ end of the solid curve in the figure). The two survival functions
are therefore shifted with respect to each other, with few years of time overlap. This situation makes
it difficult to compare the two survival patterns directly, since the most interesting comparisons
34In the Appendix, we also show the results of the analysis on the 360,644 teachers teaching at any preschool,
primary and secondary level in the country. The patterns identified in the full sample follow closely those found in
the limited one.
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between groups are made looking at the same time from origin, or years since hiring in this case35.
We further explore how observable characteristics of teachers are associated with differences in
survival patterns. We show graphical results in Figure 2 and 3 for teachers belonging to the old
and the new regulation respectively. Overall we do not find striking differences in the way teacher
characteristics affect survival patterns under the two regulations. Holding a postgraduate degree is
associated with significantly higher survival rates with respect to not holding one; being female and
being located in a rural area associate with somewhat lower permanence in the system, especially
under the new regulation; as it is natural, survival decreases as the age at which the teachers first
entered the system. In the following subsection we will give special consideration to the patterns
on teacher entry scores, depicted panel (e) of Figure 3.
8.1 Entry exam scores
A very interesting dimension to look at for the case of New Regulation teachers is their entry
test score. We would expect teachers that score higher on the entry test to survive longer in
the system, under the assumptions that 1) the new regulation is effective in rewarding skills and
keeping highly skilled teachers in the system, and effective in eliminating unsatisfactory teachers
and 2) the entry exam is a good measure of the desirable skills that the reform is aiming at. To
the support of aspect 2), we shall recall the positive correlation we found between teacher entry
scores and student performance in our heterogeneity analysis (see Table A.9). Regarding aspect
1), previous work by Ome [2012b, 2013] has evidenced how the 2002 reform has made the teaching
profession more attractive to high skilled individuals, due to the change in the salary structure and
the potentially quicker ascent to top salary levels36.
We have divided teachers into quartiles37 according to their performance in the most recent
entry exam they took, and we plot the survival rates of the four groups in Panel (e) of Figure A.4.
We notice how the first (lowest-scoring) quartile exits from the teacher profession at a dramatically
faster rate with respect to the other three. All teachers in the first quartile and part of those in
35For example, looking at Figure A.2 one might conclude that new-regulation teachers experience a quite steep
dropout pattern during their early years of career (say the first five), but one cannot tell whether the same applies
to old-regulation teachers, as we do not observe them in such early years
36If we consider education level as a proxy for skills, our own data collection summarized in Table A.2 confirms this
view for both individuals holding postsecondary degrees and those holding university (undergraduate or postgraduate)
degrees: compared to the Old Regulation, the former are now enabled to reach salary levels double as high, and the
latter face a potentially much quicker ascent to the top salaries.
37The score ranges defining quartiles are [0, 58.35], (58.35, 61.4], (61.4, 64.55] and (64.55,100].
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Figure 2: Kaplan Meier survival functions by teacher characteristics (Old regulation)
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Figure 3: Kaplan Meier survival functions by teacher characteristics (New regulation)
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the second quartile have scored below the 60 points required to pass the exam and proceed to
the following stages of the entry context, on their most recent attempt. Back in Table 2 and in
Section 7.4 described how a majority of these individuals has actually never passed the entry exam,
expressing our concern about the significant share of teaching positions they occupy. The survival
patterns we describe are consistent with those facts and provide us with some food for thought:
on one hand, we find confirmation of the rather unstable nature of the employment histories of
non-accredited New Regulation teachers, with respect to their better performing colleagues. On
the other hand though, we notice that the instability may be lower than it ought to be, given that
the survival chance of these individuals in the public school system is around 50% even after 10
years of employment.
A final interesting aspect to notice is that the relationship between exam score quartiles and
expected permanence in the profession is non-monotonic, with the highest-scoring teachers showing
lower survival rates with respect to their colleagues in the two middle quartiles. The analysis on
score deciles in the Appendix (Table A.5) confirms this finding. It thus appears that even the more
skill-rewarding career structure offered by the New Regulation has not yet succeeded at making the
teaching profession as attractive to top-performers as for their more average colleagues.
9 Robustness checks
9.1 Additional time controls, and one teacher per subject
In this table we repeat our main estimation (Table 3) with additional cohort and experience. In
particular, we add two different sets of hiring cohort dummies (Columns 1 and 3) and limit the
sample to school-year-subject cells who do not contain any teachers with less than 5 or more than 40
years of experience (Columns 2 and 4). In these specifications, the effect of New-Regulation Passed
teachers reduces between 20% and 43% with respect to our main results, remaining statistically
significant throughout. The effect of New-Regulation Non-Passed teachers instead proves less robust
and cannot be distinguished from zero. The final exercise (Column 5) uses only school-year-subject
cells with only one teacher.
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Table 7: Additional time controls, limiting experience, 1 teacher per subject
Cohorts I Cohorts I +limit exper. Cohorts II
Cohorts II +
limit exper. 1 teacher
Share New Reg. Passed 0.113* 0.127** 0.145* 0.162* 0.103
(0.044) (0.042) (0.071) (0.070) (0.068)
Share New Reg. Not Passed 0.056 0.070 0.134 0.157 0.029
(0.051) (0.050) (0.095) (0.094) (0.081)
Experience 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.017*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008)
Experience^2 –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.021 0.022 0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.020) (0.013)
Age^2 –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000 –0.000 –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share Postgrad degree 0.024 0.023 0.006 0.002 0.069
(0.024) (0.024) (0.035) (0.035) (0.042)
Share hired post 1980 –0.119* –0.105
(0.054) (0.076)
Share hired post 1990 –0.111* –0.023
(0.053) (0.081)
Share hired post 2000 0.064 0.180*
(0.053) (0.083)
Share hired post 1985 –0.146* –0.134
(0.057) (0.081)
Share hired post 1995 0.006 0.003
(0.037) (0.051)
Share hired post 2005 0.071 0.124
(0.043) (0.067)
Subject dummies 3 3 3 3 3
Subject-specific trends 3 3 3 3 3
Mean(y) 43.33 43.33 43.35 43.35 42.58
sd(y) 3.292 3.292 3.346 3.346 3.324
N.obs 151,178 151,178 74,114 74,114 62,621
N.groups 29,609 29,609 25,055 25,055 25,860
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.80
Note: SE clustered by school in parentheses. Each observation is subject ‘s’ in school ‘i’ in year
‘y’. School-year fixed effects in all columns. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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10 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the effect that the 2002 reform of the public teacher career has had on the
performance of Colombian high school students. The reform introduced exam-based selection at
entry and a set of further quality incentives for teachers. We find positive and significant effects of
New Regulation teachers on student test scores, in a magnitude of around 6% of a subject standard
deviation increase in test scores when the share of these teachers goes from 0 to 1 in a given subject
in a given school and year. When the share of New Regulation teachers in a subject is still low,
increasing it yields a marginal effect up to three times as high the average one, and higher than
average gains are also to be found in larger and more educated teacher groups.
After having explored heterogeneities in the effect and survival patterns of teachers in the
education system, we are induced to conclude that the main channel through which the reform has
brought about its positive results on student performance is the selection of teacher candidates at
entry, which has been quite tight as around two thirds of initial candidates do not reach sufficiency
at the exam stage. Selection at the initial probation period and selection on tenured teachers may
also be contributing to raise the quality of surviving educators, but we are currently unable to
quantify these contributions due to the absence of data on reasons for exit from teacher records.
Our analysis has also exposed a less successful side of the post-reform setting, namely the
fact that around 30% of the New Regulation teachers recorded in the system over the 2008-2013
period are not fully accredited as they have not successfully passed the entry exam. They are
employed in temporary positions but seem to persist in this status sometimes over several years.
The intention of the law in allowing these types of temporary employments was to deal with
exceptional circumstances in which vacancies need to be filled but no eligible candidates are at
hand, but the dimension of the phenomenon appears to be larger than what would be justified by
exceptional circumstances.
In terms of future research, we believe that it shall be highly interesting to look at New Reg-
ulation teachers in some year’s time, when their employment histories will be longer and more
informative on the incentives they face over their careers. The availability of data on the rea-
sons for dismissal or voluntary departure, as well as data on voluntary formation courses attended
by teachers, would be of immense value towards understanding to which extent the permanent
evaluation aspect of the reform is effectively operating.
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A.1 Data on the past entry contests
Table A.1: Selectivity of the entry contests
CONTESTS > 1st (2004) 2nd (2005) 3rd (2006) 4th (2009)
N. of local authorities 69 66 49 66
Vacancies 50.947 23.355 14.579 25.392
Candidates to exam 140.541 134.090 109.487 228.985
Passed exam stage 60.078 (43%) 32.720 (24%) 27.931 (26%) 66.687 (29%)
Assigned to vacancy 30.568 (22%) 14.092 (11%) 13.620 (12%) 39.468 (17%)
Note: all percentages are relative to ‘Candidates to exam’
Source: MEN [2013]
A.2 Career structure, salaries and education of teachers
Table A.2: Career structure of public school teachers, and 2008 pay scales
Old Regulation (Dec. 2277 / 1979) New Regulation (Dec. 1278 / 2002)
Step Educationlevel required 2008 salary Level Step
Education
level required 2008 salary
A Secondary
school
525.240
1
A
Postsecondary
specialization
745.624
B 581.850 B 1.014.611
1 652.079 C 1.531.186
2
Postsecondary
specialization
675.922 D 1.759.188
3 717.284
2
A
Undergraduate
degree
938.340
4 745.600 B 1.421.428
5 792.628 C 1.834.801
6
Undergraduate
degree
838.439 D 1.980.454
7 938.315 Master deg. PhD deg.
8 1.030.680
3
A
Postgraduate
degree
1.415.933 1.721.798
9 1.141.779 B 1.772.111 2.154.919
10 1.250.166 C 2.017.127 2.452.864
11 1.427.513 D 2.140.784 2.603.232
12 1.698.112
13 1.879.682
14 Postgraduatedegree 2.140.766
Source: compiled by the authors based on Decree 2277 / 1979, Decree 259 / 1981, Decree 626 /
2008, Decree 624 / 2008, MEN [2008]. Salaries in 2008 Colombian Pesos. The shaded steps are
the possible entry steps for first-time teachers.
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Figure A.1: Education level of public school teachers
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A.3 Descriptive statistics
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics at school-year-subject level
Mean student score 43.33
(3.29)
Share New Regulation 0.47
(0.43)
Share New Regulation Passed 0.29
(0.38)
Share New Regulation Not Passed 0.18
(0.34)
Share Old Regulation 0.53
(0.43)
Mean age 44.20
(8.31)
Mean experience 12.49
(9.20)
Share postgraduate degree 0.21
(0.34)
N 151,178
Note: Variable means and (standard deviations).
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Table A.4: Individual-level teacher descriptives
All
teachers
Old
Regulation
All New
Regulation
New Regul.
Passed
New Regul.
Not Passed
Age 45.80 50.22 37.26 37.09 37.82
(10.06) (7.59) (8.65) (8.74) (8.35)
Experience 15.57 21.92 3.30 3.53 2.55
(11.75) (9.38) (2.50) (2.51) (2.31)
Female 0.66 0.67 0.63 0.61 0.70
(0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.49) (0.46)
Postgrad degree 0.20 0.26 0.09 0.10 0.04
(0.40) (0.44) (0.28) (0.30) (0.19)
Experience 5-40yrs 0.75 0.98 0.31 0.35 0.20
(0.43) (0.15) (0.46) (0.48) (0.40)
Age when hired 30.23 28.30 33.96 33.55 35.28
(8.12) (7.19) (8.49) (8.49) (8.37)
Rural area 0.30 0.23 0.43 0.39 0.54
(0.46) (0.42) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
Permanent position 0.85 0.99 0.58 0.70 0.19
(0.36) (0.09) (0.49) (0.46) (0.39)
Temporary position 0.11 0.01 0.32 0.19 0.74
(0.32) (0.08) (0.47) (0.39) (0.44)
Probation position 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.07
(0.18) (0.04) (0.29) (0.30) (0.25)
Most recent test score 63.69 55.32
(3.87) (3.52)
N 1743,339 1149,239 594,100 452,493 141,607
N teachers 360,644 214,920 145,724 108,735 36,989
Note: Variable means and (standard deviations).
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Table A.5: Individual-level teacher descriptives - Secondary school teachers only
All
teachers
Old
Regulation
All New
Regulation
New Regul.
Passed
New Regul.
Not Passed
Age 45.45 50.90 37.47 37.34 37.92
(9.99) (7.20) (7.93) (7.81) (8.29)
Experience 14.13 21.61 3.18 3.44 2.33
(11.43) (8.83) (2.50) (2.51) (2.23)
Female 0.55 0.57 0.54 0.51 0.62
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Postgrad degree 0.23 0.32 0.10 0.11 0.04
(0.42) (0.47) (0.30) (0.32) (0.20)
Experience 5-40yrs 0.71 0.98 0.30 0.34 0.17
(0.46) (0.13) (0.46) (0.47) (0.38)
Age when hired 31.32 29.29 34.29 33.90 35.60
(7.55) (6.78) (7.64) (7.40) (8.27)
Rural area 0.21 0.14 0.33 0.29 0.44
(0.41) (0.34) (0.47) (0.46) (0.50)
Permanent position 0.83 1.00 0.58 0.72 0.13
(0.38) (0.07) (0.49) (0.45) (0.33)
Temporary position 0.14 0.00 0.34 0.20 0.83
(0.35) (0.07) (0.47) (0.40) (0.38)
Probation position 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.04
(0.17) (0.01) (0.26) (0.27) (0.20)
Most recent test score 64.11 55.38
(3.96) (3.59)
N 437,570 259,850 177,720 136,974 40,746
N teachers 118,117 64,883 53,234 40,339 12,895
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A.4 New Regulation teachers as a single group
In Table A.6 we repeat our main estimations considering New Regulation teachers as a single group,
without distinguishing between those who have passed the entry contest and those who have not.
Table A.6: The effect of New Regulation teachers on student performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share New Regulation –0.95*** 0.63*** 0.09** 0.19*** 0.19***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age^2 –0.00*** –0.00*** –0.00*** –0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience 0.15*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience^2 –0.00*** –0.00*** –0.00*** –0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share postgrad degree 1.00*** 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Subject FE 3 3 3 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3
School FE 3 3 3
School-year FE 3 3
Subject-specific trends 3
Mean(y) 43.33 43.33 43.33 43.33 43.33
sd(y) 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29
N.obs 151,178 151,178 151,178 151,178 151,178
N.groups . . 5,969 29,609 29,609
R-squared 0.17 0.19 0.68 0.79 0.79
Note: SE clustered by school in parentheses. Each observation is subject ‘s’ in school ‘i’ in year
‘y’. No fixed effects in columns (1) and (2), school fixed effects in column (3), school-year fixed
effects in columns (4) and (5). * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
A.5 Heterogeneity Tables
These tables are behind the graphical results of panels (a)-(e) in Figure 2 in Section 6.2.
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Table A.7: Interaction with number of teachers in the
year-subject
Student test scores
Share New-R. Passed (SNP) 0.106** (0.038)
Share New-R. Not Passed 0.071 (0.044)
2 teachers 0.017 (0.023)
3 teachers 0.113*** (0.032)
4 teachers 0.192*** (0.036)
5 teachers 0.205*** (0.041)
6 teachers 0.265*** (0.049)
7 teachers 0.296*** (0.055)
8 teachers 0.321*** (0.066)
9 teachers 0.462*** (0.085)
10 teachers 0.447*** (0.090)
11 teachers 0.474*** (0.105)
2 teachers * SNP 0.067 (0.045)
3 teachers * SNP 0.165** (0.062)
4 teachers * SNP 0.184* (0.073)
5 teachers * SNP 0.407*** (0.091)
6 teachers * SNP 0.482*** (0.108)
7 teachers * SNP 0.604*** (0.137)
8 teachers * SNP 0.593*** (0.170)
9 teachers * SNP 0.638** (0.201)
10 teachers * SNP 0.495 (0.262)
11 teachers * SNP 0.533 (0.279)
Age, experience, postgrad 3
Subject FE 3
School FE 3
Year FE 3
School-year FE 3
Subject-specific trends 3
Mean(y) 43.30
sd(y) 3.29
N.obs 149,183
N.groups 29,604
R-squared 0.79
Note: SE clustered by school in parentheses. Each
observation is subject ‘s’ in school ‘i’ in year ‘y’.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A.8: Own interactions of ‘Share New-
Regulation Passed’ in the year-subject
Student test scores
Share New-R. Passed (SNP) 0.755*** (0.186)
Share New-R. Not Passed 0.111* (0.044)
SNP ^2 –1.093* (0.546)
SNP ^3 0.495 (0.372)
Age, experience, postgrad 3
Subject FE 3
School FE 3
Year FE 3
School-year FE 3
Subject-specific trends 3
Mean(y) 43.30
sd(y) 3.29
N.obs 149,183
N.groups 29,604
R-squared 0.78
Note: SE clustered by school in parentheses. Each
observation is subject ‘s’ in school ‘i’ in year ‘y’.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A.9: Interaction with average teacher score in
the year-subject
Student test scores
Share New-R. Passed (SNP) 0.163 (0.102)
Share New-R. Not Passed 0.105 (0.065)
2nd quintile 0.085* (0.039)
3rd quintile 0.105* (0.044)
4th quintile 0.181*** (0.046)
5th quintile 0.168*** (0.046)
2nd quintile * SNP –0.125 (0.101)
3rd quintile * SNP –0.066 (0.102)
4th quintile * SNP –0.133 (0.105)
5th quintile * SNP –0.102 (0.106)
Age, experience, postgrad 3
Subject FE 3
School FE 3
Year FE 3
School-year FE 3
Subject-specific trends 3
Mean(y) 43.40
sd(y) 3.24
N.obs 99,108
N.groups 27,435
R-squared 0.81
Note: SE clustered by school in parentheses. Each
observation is subject ‘s’ in school ‘i’ in year ‘y’.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A.10: Interaction with share of postgraduate de-
gree holders in the year-subject
Student test scores
Share New-R. Passed (SNP) 0.148*** (0.037)
Share New-R. Not Passed 0.103* (0.044)
Postgrad share (0, 0.5] 0.064** (0.025)
Postgrad share (0.5, 1) 0.165*** (0.036)
Postgrad share = 1 0.001 (0.028)
Postgrad share (0, 0.5] * SNP 0.210*** (0.053)
Postgrad share (0.5, 1) * SNP 0.374*** (0.112)
Postgrad share = 1 * SNP –0.028 (0.060)
Age, experience 3
Subject FE 3
School FE 3
Year FE 3
School-year FE 3
Subject-specific trends 3
Mean(y) 43.30
sd(y) 3.29
N.obs 149,183
N.groups 29,604
R-squared 0.78
Note: SE clustered by school in parentheses. Each
observation is subject ‘s’ in school ‘i’ in year ‘y’. *
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A.11: Interaction with subject dummies
Student test scores
Share New-R. Passed (SNP) 0.157*** (0.045)
Share New-R. Not Passed 0.143** (0.044)
Social Sciences –0.592*** (0.022)
Spanish 0.936*** (0.022)
English –2.766*** (0.037)
Mathematics –0.884*** (0.031)
Chemistry 0.151*** (0.026)
Physics –1.092*** (0.038)
Philosophy –4.271*** (0.037)
Social Sciences * SNP 0.073 (0.054)
Spanish * SNP 0.081 (0.052)
English * SNP –0.055 (0.069)
Mathematics * SNP 0.191** (0.062)
Chemistry * SNP 0.053 (0.053)
Physics * SNP 0.090 (0.069)
Philosophy * SNP –0.217** (0.073)
Age, experience, postgrad 3
School FE 3
Year FE 3
School-year FE 3
Subject-specific trends 3
Mean(y) 43.30
sd(y) 3.29
N.obs 149,183
N.groups 29,604
R-squared 0.78
Note: Baseline subject is Natural Sciences. SE
clustered by school in parentheses. Each obser-
vation is subject ‘s’ in school ‘i’ in year ‘y’. *
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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A.6 Survival Analysis Extensions
A.6.1 All teachers
In this section we show the results of our survival analysis extending the sample to all 360,644
teachers recorded teaching in any public preschool, primary or secondary school in the country,
among which 214,920 belong to the Old regulation and 145,724 to the New one. As in the previous
analysis on secondary school teachers, we have excluded teachers who voluntarily switched from
the Old to the New Regulation (by taking the exam) and the other cases in which the regulation
recorded is inconsistent with the year of hiring, as well as the teachers who are recorded as not
exercising in an educational structure.
Figure A.2: Kaplan-Meier survivor functions by regulation
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Kaplan-Meier survivor functions for teachers belonging to the new regulation (solid line) and the
old regulation (dashed line), and 95% confidence intervals.
A.6.2 Survival functions by entry score deciles
Given the interesting results described in Section 8.1 about survival patterns by entry exam scores,
we expand the analysis by looking at score deciles instead of quartiles, in order to detect potentially
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finer patterns. The analysis on deciles reflects the conclusions of the one on quartiles: teachers in the
lowest three score deciles show the worst survival patterns, but at higher score levels the relationship
between scores and expected survival is not monotonic, with survival improving at first, peaking
at the mid of the distribution (5th decile) and then lowering somewhat, with the highest scores
showing on average lower survival rates than mid-range scorers.
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Figure A.3: Kaplan Meier survival functions by teacher characteristics (Old regulation)
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Figure A.4: Kaplan Meier survival functions by teacher characteristics (New regulation)
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Figure A.5: Kaplan Meier survival functions by entry test score deciles
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(b) Saber 11 teachers
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